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  The goal of my thesis is to understand why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism can 
secure empirical realism, the idea that there really exists an objective world that we can 
come to know through experience. I maintain that, according to Kant, the possibility of 
coming to know objective reality depends upon the possibility of referring to objects, 
which itself, Kant thinks, can be explained by transcendental idealism. The 
transcendental idealist worldview is supposed by Kant to explain the possibility of 
referring to objects because it recognizes that objects must conform to cognition and not 
the other way around. Therefore, I explore what Kant means by objects conforming to 
cognition. I start with the fact that Kant says that the conditions for the possibility of our 
experience of objects must be identical with the conditions for the possibility of those 
objects themselves. I then argue that this means that according to the transcendental 
idealist worldview, objective reality, if it is to be full-blooded objective reality, must be 
essentially able to show up for us in experience. In opposition to this worldview stands 
what Kant calls transcendental realism, the prevailing worldview that supposes that full-
blooded objective reality simply cannot be essentially able to show up for us in 
experience. Kant says that the prevailing transcendental realist worldview, of which he 
claims all philosophies hitherto are variations, will never be able to explain the possibility 
of referring to objects, and that only his transcendental idealism can. Because Kant 
imputes so much importance to the opposition, I elaborate the distinction between 
transcendental idealism and transcendental realism, and clarify why only the latter can, as 
the former cannot, explain the possibility of referring to objects and thus the possibility of 
knowing an objective world, and thereby secure an empirical realism.      
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Kant says that the transcendental idealist can be an empirical realist. I take him to 
mean that transcendental idealism can secure the truth of empirical realism, the idea that 
there really exists an objective world that we can come to know through experience. The 
goal of my thesis is to understand why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism can 
secure empirical realism.  
In the first chapter, “Objective Reference,” I maintain that, according to Kant, the 
possibility of coming to know objective reality depends upon the possibility of referring 
to objects, that is, the possibility of objective reference. I argue that the possibility of 
objective reference is what is primarily at stake in Kant’s theoretical philosophy and that 
Kant’s transcendental idealism is intended to explain it. If transcendental idealism is 
supposed to explain the possibility of objective reference, it seems odd that Kant would 
claim that objective reality is mere appearance. I try to justify Kant’s claim by arguing 
that, for Kant, objective reality must be appearance, in the sense that objective reality, in 
order to be objective reality, must be able to show up for us in experience as something to 
form judgments about. 
Kant thinks that transcendental idealism can explain the possibility of objective 
reference because it holds that objects must conform to cognition and not the other way 
around. Therefore, in the second chapter, “The Possibility of Objective Reference,” I 
explore what Kant might mean when he says that objects conform to cognition, and I 
conclude that Kant means that the conditions for the possibility of our experience of 
objects must be identical with the conditions for the possibility of those objects 
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themselves. If I am right here, and if I am right in my earlier analysis of Kant’s claim that 
objective reality must be appearance, then this implies that according to the 
transcendental idealist worldview, objective reality, if it is to be full-blooded objective 
reality, must be essentially able to show up for us in experience. I then articulate how 
understanding objective reality in this way is supposed by Kant to explain the possibility 
of objective reference. 
In opposition to his transcendental idealist worldview stands what Kant calls 
transcendental realism, the prevailing worldview that, if my argument is correct, supposes 
that full-blooded objective reality simply cannot be essentially able to show up for us in 
experience. Kant says that this prevailing transcendental realist worldview, of which he 
boldly claims all philosophies hitherto are variations, will never be able to explain the 
possibility of objective reference, and that only his transcendental idealism can. Because 
Kant imputes so much importance to the opposition, I spend my third chapter, 
“Transcendental Idealism, Transcendental Realism, and the Possibility of Objective 
Reference,” elaborating the distinction between transcendental idealism and 
transcendental realism. I do this with the intent of clarifying why Kant thinks that only 
the former can, as the latter cannot, explain the possibility of referring to objects and thus 
the possibility of knowing an objective world, and thereby secure an empirical realism.      
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CHAPTER ONE: 
OBJECTIVE REFERENCE 
 
My aim in this first chapter is to argue that the notion of objective reference is 
decisive for Kant’s theoretical project.1 If we understand that Kant’s motivation is to 
explain the possibility of objective reference, then, as I will argue in the second and third 
chapters, we will be able to understand how and why Kant thinks that transcendental 
idealism is the best way to secure empirical realism, the idea that there really exists an 
objective world that we can come to know through experience. 
Kant’s avowed project is to show that transcendental idealism can explain how we 
are able to have knowledge, in and through experience, of objective reality (B20, 
A155/B194).2 But this project presupposes that we are, in fact, able to have knowledge, 
in and through experience, of objective reality. Therefore, we must begin where Kant 
begins, at least logically, with the idea that we can have experience of objective reality 
and come to have knowledge of it.  
Kant’s way of saying that there is an objective reality, that we can experience it, 
and that we can have knowledge of it is to say that there is such a thing as synthetic a 
                                                
1 Although I do not refer explicitly to his work in this chapter, Gordon G. Brittan, Jr. has inspired me to 
interpret Kant this way. I refer the reader to a few relevant works: Kant’s Theory of Science (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978); “The Reality of Reference: Comments on Carl Posy’s ‘Where Have All 
the Objects Gone?’,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986), XXV, Supplement; and “Kant and the 
Objects of Theory,” in New Essays on Kant, ed. by Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1987).     
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), henceforth referred to as the Critique. All references to the A or B 
versions of the Critique are to this edition. 
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priori judgment (B20, A155/B194).3 And to say that there is such a thing as synthetic a 
priori judgment is to say, roughly, first, that we are assured, before any particular 
experience of the world, that we can possibly experience and come to know its objects, 
and second, that we are assured, before any particular experience of the world, that the 
objects we can experience and come to know are really possible ingredients of objective 
reality.4   
My way of saying that there is an objective reality, that we can experience it, and 
that we can have knowledge of it is to say that there is such a thing as objective reference. 
It is reasonable to ask, if they are supposed to denote the same thing, what the difference 
is between saying that there is such a thing as synthetic a priori judgment and saying that 
there is such a thing as objective reference. The difference is one of emphasis, but it is 
significant. Both manners of speaking refer to the same thing; they denote that we can 
and do, as a matter of fact, have experience and knowledge of really existing objects. But 
the first emphasizes the knowledge of objects, while the second emphasizes the objects of 
knowledge. The problem with the first manner of speaking is that it gives Kant’s project 
an epistemological sheen, when Kant’s project, in my view, is not primarily an 
epistemological project.  
In his book, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison argues that 
transcendental idealism “is a doctrine of epistemological modesty, since it denies finite 
                                                
3 See also Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward 
as Science, trans. by Paul Carus, ed. by James W. Ellington, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2001), pp. 17 and 30, henceforth referred to as the Prolegomena. All references are to this 
edition.  
4 Note that the possibility, not the actuality, of objects is assured. I will clarify later on, in this chapter and 
the next, what a possible object is.  
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cognizers like ourselves any purchase on the God’s-eye view of things.”5 That is, “Kant’s 
so-called Copernican revolution is to be viewed . . . as a ‘paradigm shift’ . . . in our 
understanding of what counts as knowing.”6 Therefore, according to Allison, the 
Categories that Kant enumerated and identified as the conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge “function as epistemic conditions.”7  
Now, I think Allison is right to point out that Kant effected a shift in our 
understanding of what it means to have knowledge of something. And Allison does 
explain that the epistemic conditions are also the conditions for the representation of 
objects. But what I want to say is that the shift in our understanding of what counts as 
knowing is effected through a shift in our understanding of the character of what is 
known, that is, the character of objective reality. Let me explain.   
In the beginning of his letter of February 21, 1772, to his student, Marcus Hertz, 
Kant sketches the genesis of his three great Critiques, and recounts what has lately been 
occupying his thoughts.8 He identifies the one question that guides both the critical 
project in general and the Critique of Pure Reason in particular. He writes, 
While I was thinking through the theoretical part in its whole extent and 
the reciprocal relations of its sections, I noticed that there was still 
something essential that was lacking, which I (like others) in my long 
metaphysical inquiries had failed to consider and which indeed constitutes 
the key to the whole secret of metaphysics that had until then remained 
hidden to itself. I asked myself, namely: on what grounds rests the 
reference of what in us is called representation to the object?9   
 
                                                
5 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), p. xvi. 
6 Kant's Transcendental Idealism, p. xvi. 
7 Ibid., p. 11. 
8 The letter is reprinted in Prolegomena, pp. 117-122. 
9 Ibid., p. 117, my emphasis. 
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Kant says here that the “whole secret of metaphysics” lies in discovering how it is 
possible for our representations to refer to objects. We may infer, then, that 
transcendental idealism is designed to show how it is possible for our representations to 
refer to objects. But Kant also says, as any reader of the Critique of Pure Reason knows, 
that transcendental idealism is designed to show how knowledge is possible (B19-B20). 
How is the possibility of representational reference connected with the possibility of 
knowledge? 
According to Kant, knowledge is a systematically unified body of objectively true 
judgments (A832-836/B860-864). We possess knowledge, therefore, only if we possess 
true judgments and only if those judgments are objective. Further, Kant says, we possess 
an objectively true or objectively false judgment depending upon whether the judgment 
agrees or disagrees with its object (A58/B82). That is, we possess an objectively true 
judgment only if the judgment agrees with its object and we possess an objectively false 
judgment only if the judgment disagrees with its object. But if this is the case, then 
objectively true judgments and objectively false judgments each must be about objects. 
An object must be there in the first place as something about which to make judgments, 
else our judgments would have nothing with which to agree or disagree. This is to say 
that an object must be there in the first place if judgments are to be possibly objectively 
true or false, that is, meaningful (A155/B194). The job of a representation, we may infer, 
is to give us an object about which we can make true or false judgments. This must be 
why Kant is concerned to show how representations refer to objects. Judgments, to be 
possibly objectively true or false, must be objectively meaningful, must have objects with 
which to agree or to disagree, and it is representation that is supposed to give us objects. 
 7 
In short, then, knowledge consists in objectively true judgments, which, in order 
to be true or false, must be antecedently meaningful, which, for Kant, means that they 
must refer somehow to objects (B20). And this is how the possibility of knowledge is 
connected to the possibility of representation: Knowledge is possible only if 
representation is, so if we explain how it is possible in the first place for representations 
to refer to objects, then we have gone some way toward explaining how knowledge is 
possible.  
So transcendental idealism is supposed to demonstrate how it is possible to 
represent objects, which in turn will help to show how knowledge is possible. 
Transcendental idealism does effect, in Allison’s words, “a radical reconceptualization of 
human knowledge as based on a priori conditions.”10 But it does this only in the sense 
that these a priori conditions are set forth first of all as providing a basis for the 
possibility of referring to objects, which is required for any true and thus meaningful 
judgment. Allison rightly notes that the conditions for the possibility of knowledge are 
also the conditions for the possibility of representing objects,11 but he does not accord the 
same significance to the possibility of representing objects as I think Kant does. That is, 
on my view, Kant's reconceptualization of human knowledge, which Allison correctly 
identifies, is based upon Kant's reconceptualization of objective reference. The ultimate 
question, the whole secret of metaphysics, is how objective reality shows up for us in the 
first place, as something to have any kind of thought about, true or false, certain or 
defeasible, justified or not. This is the principal reason that Kant’s project should not be 
understood, at least in the first instance, as an epistemological project.     
                                                
10 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. 19. 
11 Ibid., p. 11. 
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But there is another reason. This second reason, which is closely allied with the 
first, is that Kant is singularly unmoved by epistemological concerns about the certainty 
and justifiability of our beliefs. For Kant, the certainty and justifiability of our beliefs are 
not really in question. In the Preface to the A Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he 
says, 
Now and again one hears complaints about the superficiality of our age’s 
way of thinking, and about the decay of well-grounded science. Yet I do 
not see that those sciences whose grounds are well laid, such as 
mathematics, physics, etc., in the least deserve this charge; rather, they 
maintain their old reputation for well-groundedness, and in the case of 
natural science, even surpass it (Axi, n.). 
 
There are systems of well-grounded beliefs. This fact, according to Kant, is unassailable. 
As I have said, Kant begins his project with the fact that we have knowledge, and if the 
concept of knowledge is later analyzed, the analysis should take as a clue the knowledge 
we already actually have. Transcendental idealism, therefore, is not supposed to 
demonstrate what knowledge is per se, nor is it concerned with the questions that arise 
inevitably upon reflection on what knowledge is per se. Transcendental idealism is not 
supposed to answer the question of whether knowledge is justified true belief, or to 
answer the question, based upon what we conclude knowledge is per se, whether we 
really do have knowledge. Kant just assumes that we really do have knowledge and that 
the reason we do is that we have bodies of true judgments about objective reality. What is 
at stake originally for Kant is not the truth or certainty or groundedness of our 
knowledge, but the possibility of its objective reference.  
The task, in Kant’s own words, is to explain   
the possibility . . . of all sciences that contain a theoretical a priori 
cognition of objects, i.e., the answer to the questions: 
How is pure mathematics possible?  
 9 
How is pure natural science possible?  
About these sciences, since they are actually given, it can appropriately be 
asked how they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved 
through their actuality (B20).  
  
Knowledge is actual and therefore possible, and the possibility of knowledge lies in the 
possibility of objective reference, which lies in the possibility of representing objects, 
mathematical, natural, or otherwise. As Kant says, “If a cognition is to have objective 
reality, i.e., to be related to an object, and is to have significance and sense in that object, 
the object must be able to be given in some way” (A155/B194, my emphasis).  
Apparently, the objectivity of our knowledge requires that objects are given to 
us.12 And, just as apparently, it is the essential task of transcendental idealism to explain 
how objects are given to us in the first place. If it is the essential task of transcendental 
idealism to explain how objects are given to us in the first place, as something to form 
beliefs about, then transcendental idealism is not primarily an epistemological theory. It 
is primarily a theory of objective reference.  
Many philosophers have wondered whether there is such thing as knowledge of 
an objective reality. There are those who declare that reference to an objective world is 
impossible, and therefore claim that we have knowledge only of the contents of our own 
minds. These philosophers are “dogmatic idealists” (A377, B274). There are also 
“skeptical” (A377) or “problematic idealists” (B274), who declare that reference to an 
objective world, though not impossible, is indemonstrable, and therefore always and 
inevitably in doubt. Sometimes, Kant gathers the two kinds under one idealism that he 
                                                
12 That is, it is not the case that Kant thinks that there are objects only insofar as we are able to make 
objective judgments. For Kant, at least, intersubjective agreement does not guarantee objectivity. Objects 
do. 
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calls “material” or “empirical idealism,” which is “the common idealism that itself doubts 
or denies the existence of external things” (B519, n.).  
It is thus with a dramatic and deliberate artlessness that Kant simply grants 
knowledge, and thus objective reference. In granting knowledge, Kant implicitly rejects 
the sophisticated skeptical poses of wondering whether we can have knowledge and 
whether there really is an objective reality which our beliefs may or may not be about. 
We can have knowledge, and it can be of an objective reality. The question is not whether 
we can have knowledge of real objects. The question is, given that we can and do have 
knowledge of real objects, how we can do so. And any answer to this question will first 
have to answer the question of how we can refer to objects in the first place. 
Just as some thinkers have questioned whether we can represent the world to 
ourselves, some influential philosophers have attacked the notion that we represent the 
world to ourselves.13 But I will go ahead and follow Kant in using the expressions to 
represent and representation. I do this because their German equivalents, vorstellen and 
Vorstellung, translate literally into “to place before” and “a placing-before,” and these 
translations, I think, do not imply what antirepresentationalists might dismiss as ghostly 
images that intervene between knowers and the world. Thus, when Kant says that we can 
represent objects, he is saying that in and through experience, objects are, in some sense, 
placed before us.   
There are various ways in which objects can be placed before us. Concepts and 
intuitions, the elements that are united in cognition, each can be understood as 
representations, in the sense that each serve to place objects before us, the first 
                                                
13 For especially clear denunciations, see Donald Davidson, “The Myth of the Subjective,” in Subjective, 
Intersubjective, and Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), and Richard Rorty, “Introduction,” in 
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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immediately and singularly (A90-91/B122-123) and the second mediately and generally 
(A320/B376). Therefore, cognition, as the cooperative result of intuitive, sensuous 
representation and conceptual, rational representation, is a variety of representation 
(A50/B74, A320/B376).14 In this paper, I will understand as the paradigm case of 
representation the cooperation of concepts and intuitions to place objects before us, 
objects about which we can then make judgments and possibly come to have knowledge. 
But I will still call it representation, instead of cognition, to emphasize its priority to the 
attainment of knowledge.  
By understanding representation in this way, I hope to avoid the connotations of 
images and pictures, of shadows and specters, and of screens and veils that often 
accompany the notion of representation. For all Kant seems to mean is that in 
representation objects are placed before us. But Kant does intend further that these 
placings-before, as the unification of intuitions and concepts, are conceptually articulated. 
For Kant says that “cognition in the proper sense”—what I have referred to as the 
paradigm case of representation—is the result of a synthesis, which is “the action of 
putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their 
manifoldness in one cognition” (A77/B103), and doing so “in accordance with concepts” 
(A112). The conceptualizing activity of the understanding “collects the elements for 
cognitions and unifies them into a certain content” (A78/B104). Concepts, in addition to 
contributing to the generality of the representational content (A320/B376), also 
contribute to its unity. And Kant makes it clear that the conceptually guided bringing-
together of the elements for cognition is a significant feature, if not the most significant 
                                                
14 See A320 for a succinct typology of representation. 
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feature of representation. In fact, according to Kant, it is only if we begin with the idea of 
a successful, conceptually unified representation of an object that we can distinguish 
between the contributions of intuitions and concepts to representation. But even though 
concepts are a significant feature, or the most significant feature, of representation, there 
can be no representation without intuition. That is, concepts and intuitions must cooperate 
in order to yield representation in the paradigm case. Hence the well-noted emptiness of 
isolated thoughts and blindness of isolated intuitions (A50-51/B74-75). Every 
representation of an object is a conceptually articulated unification of concepts and 
intuitions. Therefore, to represent objects is to conceptualize them.15   
Now, my identification of representation with conceptualization therefore may 
seem to undermine my wish to avoid connotations of intervening images. For concepts, 
no less than representations, have traditionally been understood as (at least involving) 
intervening mental pictures.16 It is best at this point to defer to Kant’s own definition of 
concepts. In the Critique, Kant defines concepts at least six different ways, but each of 
his definitions marks commonality as characteristic of concepts (A320/B276).17 So, I will 
assume that to say that representations are conceptually articulated is at least to say that 
representing an object involves representing the object as having a property that is 
                                                
15 I understand that, according to Kant, mere conceptual play does not yield knowledge, so that although 
we can, for example, form a concept of God, we cannot represent God. I will use the word “conceptualize” 
to denote the act of successful, experiential representation and use the word “think” to denote, as Kant does 
(B146), the act of merely transforming one concept into another.  
16 See, for instance, Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by David Fate Norton 
and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. by A. C. Fraser, 2 vols (New York: Dover, 1959); and Steven Pinker, The Language 
Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind (London: Penguin Press, 1994).  
17 See Robert Hanna’s article, “Kant’s Theory of Judgment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Edward N. Zalta, ed., July 28, 2004, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/, accessed January 12, 
2008. 
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common, or possibly common, with other objects.18 When we represent the number three, 
we represent it as being a number, which is a property common with other objects. When 
we represent an electron, we represent it as having a spin and being an electron, which 
are properties common with other objects. When we represent a blue sphere, we represent 
it as being blue and being a sphere, which are properties common with other objects.   
But this does not mean that we experience and represent only generalities. For 
representation involves both concepts and intuitions, and intuition, according to Kant, 
brings with it the singularity of representational content (A90-91/B122-123). So, because 
representation is the cooperative result of concepts and intuitions, there is a singularity to 
our representations as well as a generality. I might make the same point differently by 
saying that an object we place before us will be both singular and general. I will 
characterize Kantian objects later, so for now I will just say that part of what it is to be an 
object is to be able to be singled out from other objects in the world but simultaneously 
understood as belonging with other objects in the world. Nothing else is the number 
three, but lots of things are numbers. This blue sphere is blue, like other things, and 
spherical, like other things, but it is still this blue sphere. To say that representation is 
conceptualization is to say that when we place an object before us, the object before us 
will be a conceptually guided union of particularity and commonality.19  
                                                
18 For an elaboration of this idea, see Hannah Ginsborg, “Empirical Concepts and Perceptual Contents,” 
European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 3, December 2006, pp. 349-372. 
19 There is some debate about whether the representational content that Kantian intuitions contribute is 
conceptual or nonconceptual. For Kant says such things as, “Objects can indeed appear to us without 
necessarily having to be related to [the concept-employing] functions of the understanding” (A89/B122). I 
assume that intuitions provide conceptual representational content only in the sense that intuitions give us 
objects with general spatiotemporal features. Even at the level of intuition, objects can have both 
particularity and commonality: We can be given this object at this spatiotemporal location, but lots of other 
things have spatiotemporal locations. 
 14 
My identification of representation with conceptualization therefore should not 
undermine the need to avoid connotations of intervening images. In fact, if representation 
is conceptualization, then we might as well say that conceptualizing is just a way for 
objects to be placed before us. It is not some epistemologically dubious method of 
understanding objects, as one tradition, which revolves around Friedrich Nietzsche, might 
have it.20 Nietzsche is an instructive foil here, because he vigorously argues that our 
concepts are “a mobile army of metaphors,” meaning, among many other things, that our 
concepts, in virtue of their generality, cannot capture the particularity of objects, and are 
therefore straightforward falsehoods.21 Conceptualizing, according to this view, is a way 
to know the world, and it does not do a very good job of it. Nietzsche’s view exemplifies 
an entire way of thinking about our relationship to the world, a way of thinking of which 
Kant tries to disabuse us. This way of thinking supposes that objective reality is not 
essentially representable. I spend the second and third chapters defining and elaborating 
the contrast between this way of thinking and the way of thinking Kant recommends, so I 
will not discuss it here in any depth. I just want to point out that the way of thinking 
exemplified by Nietzsche holds that conceptualization is first of all a way to know 
objective reality. In this picture, it is easy to see that concepts are supposed to intrude 
somewhere between us and the real. 
But for Kant, conceptualizing—representing—is a way to know objective reality 
only in the sense that it is a way, antecedently, for objective reality to be placed before us 
as something to know. It is probably better just to say that concepts, or representations, 
                                                
20 See especially The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), Section 374, 
and “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” and Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. 
and trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1960).  
21 “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 47. 
 15 
are not ways to know objects, that they are, rather, ways for objects to be given to us. 
That is, according to Kant, as I take him, representing, as conceptual and intuitive, is a 
semantic activity, not an epistemic one. Representations first of all carry meaning, not 
truth or falsity.22 Therefore, as I will soon explain, falsity, misunderstanding, illusion, and 
the like can only happen later. Rather than potentially distorting objective reality, 
conceptualization, or representation, brings objective reality into view.23        
But what is objective reality? Part of Kant’s transcendental project, as I have 
suggested, is to redefine the notions of object, objectivity, and objective reality. He 
intends to show us that we have been thinking of objective reality, and our relation to it, 
in the wrong way, that is, in a transcendental realist way. Later on, in the following 
chapters, I will scrutinize both the transcendental realist way and Kant’s transcendental 
idealist way of thinking about objective reality and our relation to it. So without going 
into too much depth right now, let me just give a sketch of what I take Kant to mean 
when he talks about objects and objective reality, with the hope that anything particularly 
contentious can be supported by what I say later.  
Consider one of Kant’s definitions of nature, namely, that it is the totality of 
objects of possible experience determined according to laws.24 We can gather from this 
brief characterization that objects are things we can possibly experience, that objects 
must always be part of a larger, lawful whole, and that this whole is nature. As an 
approximation, then, we can think of objects as identifiable parts of natural reality, and 
                                                
22 Another translation of  Vorstellung, which is usually translated as “representation,” is  “meaning.”  
23 Hegel latches on to this utterly Kantian idea and gives it an influential expression. See especially his 
“Introduction” in Phenomenology of Spirit, A. V. Miller, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
paragraphs 73-76. John McDowell, calling it a “domesticated Hegelianism,” enlarges the same idea in 
Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).    
24 Prolegomena, pp. 35-37. 
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think of natural reality as including anything that could possibly find itself in a natural 
theory—things such as galaxies, stars, planets, mountains, otters, cells, molecules, atoms, 
neutrinos, fields, and speech acts, and properties such as average fecundities, charge, 
spin, and specific gravities. And since possibility, not actuality, is at stake in the 
definition of objects, we should also include controversially or incorrectly postulated 
things such as libidos, death drives, rational consumers, strings, epicycles, the planet 
Vulcan, phlogiston, and the aether. For all of these, like galaxies and specific densities, 
are, in a wide sense, naturally possible, though perhaps not actual. They are naturally 
possible because they have found themselves in a theory at one time or another and have 
therefore been provided identity conditions that connected them with other natural 
phenomena, so that if they actually existed in nature, we could probably identify them. 
All of this is to say, roughly, that objects must be able show up for us in experience and 
must be able to fit into the wider patterns of natural reality. 
Of course, I have left out a crucial and thoroughly Kantian aspect of this 
definition: that objective reality is appearance. But if we keep in mind the notion of 
objective reference, and the way Kant’s project is built around it, then the idea that 
objective reality is appearance is less objectionable than we may suppose at first glance.  
To understand why Kant thinks that objective reality is appearance, we have first 
to understand what Allison, for one, has called the transcendental distinction.25 The 
transcendental distinction is the distinction between things that we can, in and through 
experience, represent and things that we cannot. The things we can represent Kant calls 
appearances, and the things we cannot he calls things in themselves. Whether the 
                                                
25 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, especially Chapters 1 and 2. 
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distinction between appearances and things in themselves is one between distinct 
ontological realms (the two-worlds view) or between distinct ways of knowing one and 
the same thing (the two-aspect view) is a subject for debate in Kant scholarship.26 It is 
only for ease and generality that I say that the distinction is one between representable 
and unrepresentable things. I do not intend anything in my thesis to support either 
interpretation, though I certainly may be found to assume one or the other. What matters 
most for me here, however, is representability and unrepresentability. 
What should occur to us right away is how peculiar Kant’s transcendental 
distinction is. Transcendentally speaking, he says, we are not supposed to classify things 
ultimately according to whether they are substance or accident, material or mental, 
subject or object, or illusion or reality. We are supposed to classify things as essentially 
representable or essentially unrepresentable. According to Kant, those things that are 
essentially representable are those things that satisfy the conditions for the possibility of 
experience and knowledge. Those things that are essentially unrepresentable do not. So to 
classify things as representable or unrepresentable is to distinguish those things that fall 
under conditions for the possibility of experience—appearances—from those things that 
do not—things in themselves.  From this fact alone, we may conclude that if we try to 
assimilate the transcendental distinction to more familiar ones, such as that between 
illusion and reality, we are likely to misunderstand it.   
Given Kant’s sometimes infelicitous way of putting things, however, it is easy to 
misread the transcendental distinction. We can always find Kant saying such things as, 
                                                
26 See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) for 
an articulation of the two-worlds view and Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism for an 
articulation of the two-aspect view. Allison is indebted to Graham Bird, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
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“Matter and corporeal things . . . are merely appearances, i.e., mere modes of 
representation, which are always found only in us, and their reality, just as much as that 
of my own thoughts, rests on immediate consciousness” (A372). We may discover in 
passages like these, which pepper the Critique of Pure Reason, ideas to the effect that 
what we presume are objects are really just “appearances in us,” which supposedly means 
that objects are just mental items. Such ideas reasonably compel some thinkers, such as 
Paul Guyer, Karl Ameriks, and Peter Strawson, all of whom I will address in a moment, 
to take the transcendental distinction as a distinction between appearance and reality, 
where the objects of which we can have knowledge are just mental entities, the mind’s 
own creations, and where full-blooded reality is forever unknowable.  
For example, Guyer says that in defining objects as appearances, Kant has acted 
to “degrade ordinary objects to mere representations of themselves, or identify objects 
possessing spatial and temporal properties with mere mental entities;”27 Ameriks argues 
that Kant assigns a heavy metaphysical significance to things in themselves, and that any 
reading of Kant that gives us “no reason to think the non-ideal has a greater ontological 
status than the ideal” ignores Kant’s deepest metaphysical commitments;28 and Strawson 
dismisses transcendental idealism as the doctrine that “reality is supersensible and that we 
can have no knowledge of it.”29 So Guyer tells us that Kant thinks that objects are really 
just mental items, Ameriks tells us that Kant thinks that things in themselves are the 
really real, and Strawson tells us that Kant thinks that we can only know the mental 
items, and not the really real. These three interpretations combine in the idea that the 
                                                
27 Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, pp. 334-35. 
28 Karl Ameriks, “Kantian Idealism Today,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1992), p. 334. 
29 Peter Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 
1966), p. 16. 
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transcendental distinction is one between appearance and reality. Allison neatly 
summarizes the situation:     
According to many of its critics, transcendental idealism is a metaphysical 
theory that affirms the uncognizability of the ‘real’ (things in themselves) 
and relegates cognition to the purely subjective realm of representations 
(appearances). It thus combines a phenomenalistic, essentially Berkeleian, 
account of what is actually experienced by the mind, and therefore 
cognizable, namely, its own representations, with the postulation of an 
additional set of [really real] entities, which, in terms of the very theory, 
are uncognizable.30 
  
As Allison says, the usual gloss on the transcendental distinction, as we can see, is 
that it is one between appearance and reality.31 Transcendental idealism is seen as 
relegating the world of objects in lawful relations to the realm of mere appearances, 
which, it is suggested, are just mental entities. Therefore, the suggestion continues, when 
we have knowledge of the supposed objective world, we really just have knowledge of 
the contents of our own minds—how things seem to us, not how they really are. If Kant 
is right, it is supposed, then there only seems to be an objective world and we only seem 
to have knowledge of it.   
I think there are, on the face of it, at least four things wrong with this line of 
interpretation. First, because Kant introduced it, presumably he did not intend the 
transcendental distinction between essentially representable things and essentially 
unrepresentable things to be the familiar appearance-reality distinction between how 
things seem and how things really are. Kant surely does not intend to rename a distinction 
that we have already long been acquainted with.  
                                                
30 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. 4.  
31 In his book, Allison traces the arguments of Strawson, Guyer, and Ameriks. I do not have anything to 
add here. I am more concerned to show that there is a customary understanding of Kant as redescribing 
objects as mental items, permitting us knowledge only of mental items, and denying us knowledge of 
reality beyond those mental items.  
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Second, to conclude that the transcendental distinction is a distinction between 
how things seem and how things really are, and therewith to conclude that there only 
seems to be a knowable, objective world, is to dismiss the fact, which we saw earlier, that 
Kant begins his critical project by assuming that there really is an objective world and we 
can know it. The fact that there really is an objective world and we can know it is the 
given explanandum for which Kant’s theoretical project is supposed to be the explanans. 
But the appearance-reality distinction implies that the world that appears to us in 
experience may be objectively unreal and that the objectively real may not even appear to 
us in experience. Yet this does not square with the empirical realism that Kant assumes 
and sets out to explain.  
Third, the construal of the transcendental distinction as the appearance-reality 
distinction, and the consequent rejection of transcendental idealism, rest on 
transcendental realist assumptions. Earlier, I noted that one of transcendental realism’s 
basic assumptions is that objective reality is not essentially representable. As I will 
explain in the third chapter, this assumption is actually an abbreviation of the following 
two, tightly connected, transcendental realist assumptions: first, that objects in lawful 
relations really exist only if they are not appearances, that is, have not fallen under the 
conditions for the possibility of experience and knowledge, and second, that knowledge 
of appearances, of things that have fallen under the conditions for the possibility of 
experience and knowledge, is an inferior imitation of a pure, divine, and therefore 
epistemically ideal knowledge. Hence, when Kant says that the objects of which we can 
have knowledge are appearances in us, critics suppose that by “appearances” Kant means 
whatever it is that is opposed to the really real, that their being “in us” means that they 
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are mental items, and that, regardless of Kant’s claims, we therefore have no genuine 
knowledge of reality. That is, critics tend to settle upon transcendental realist 
interpretations of “object,” “knowledge,” “appearance,” and “in us,” and then try to fit 
these transcendental realist interpretations into Kant’s transcendental idealism. This is 
unfortunate, since the success of Kant’s project rests upon reinterpreting these notions in 
a transcendental idealist manner. Kant’s transcendental idealism should not be evaluated 
from the standpoint of the very theory he is trying to invalidate.  
Fourth, and quite simply, Kant explicitly rejects the common interpretation of the 
transcendental distinction as one between appearance and reality. He says in the 
Prolegomena that 
we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection, ‘that by our 
admitting the ideality of space and of time, the whole sensible world 
would be turned into mere illusion.’ . . . When an appearance is given us, 
we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter. The 
appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment upon the 
understanding; and the only question is whether in the determination of 
the object there is truth or not. . . . And it is not the fault of the 
appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth . . . The senses 
represent to us the paths of the planets as now progressive, now 
retrogressive; and herein is neither falsehood nor truth, because as long as 
we hold this to be nothing but appearance we do not judge of the objective 
nature of their motion. . . . We say [the planets] appear to move backward; 
it is not the senses however which must be charged with the illusion, but 
the understanding, whose province alone it is to make an objective 
judgment on appearances. . . . [I]llusion or truth will arise according as we 
are negligent or careful. It is merely a question of the use of sensuous 
representations in the understanding, and not of their origin.32 
 
Kant makes it clear that when appearances are given us, it is not as if we have thereby 
been given mere falsehoods and denied access to the truth. Appearances are just given, 
and it is only after they have been given that truth and falsity can arise, “according as we 
                                                
32 Pp. 31-32. 
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are negligent or careful” in our deployment of the understanding. “It is not the fault of the 
appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth,” Kant says. Or, to put it differently, 
as Kant does at the end of the long passage just quoted, both illusion and truth originate 
in the appearances that are given us. So it is not that illusion originates in the appearance 
of an unreal object and truth in the appearance of a real one. For, as Kant says, “truth and 
illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited” (B350). It is rather the case that one 
and the same realm of (possible) objects can appear to us, from which both illusion and 
truth originate, depending upon our judiciousness. This makes sense, too, if, as I 
maintained earlier, Kant’s project is to explain how objective reality shows up for us in 
the first place, as something about which we can make true or false judgments. 
I think, then, that it is wrong to interpret the transcendental distinction as one 
between appearance and reality, between how things seem and how they really are. The 
transcendental distinction is, rather, the distinction between those things we can, through 
experience, represent and those we cannot. As I noted earlier, Kant believes that those 
things that we can represent are those things that satisfy the conditions for the possibility 
of experience and knowledge, and those things that we cannot represent are those things 
that do not satisfy these conditions. And, as I have said, Kant calls the unexperienceable, 
unknowable things things in themselves, and calls appearances the experienceable, 
knowable things—the world of objects in lawful relations. The objective world, therefore, 
is appearance. But, as I have insisted, we should not let this at first striking equation lure 
us into thinking that Kant proclaims the objective world to be unreal. We should try to 
figure out why Kant would say that the commonsensically real world of objects is 
appearance. 
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We should begin with the word “appearance.” The German word for “to appear,” 
erscheinen, is ambiguous among “to seem,” “to happen,” “to show up,” and “to figure, as 
in a story.” The objective world is appearance in all of these senses. For it is certainly full 
of things that happen, that figure in stories, and that show up. The objects that occupy the 
world are always interacting with other objects, causing new states of affairs to appear, or 
to happen. And insofar as objects interact with other objects in patterned ways, 
instantiating a wider, lawful order, they figure in the universe’s natural story—its 
cosmology. The objects that figure in the natural story also appear in the sense of 
showing up, as when an old friend shows up at the door. In this latter sense of 
appearance, we of course do not contrast our old friend’s appearing at the door with some 
way things really are. We wonder why she is here and how she came to be here, not 
whether she is really here. Nor do we think she simply, magically, appeared at our door. 
We suppose that her showing up is part of a larger concatenation of happenings, part of a 
larger story. It is thus in these senses that the objects of our experience appear.  
Now, in most philosophical contexts, we tend to think of appearing in the very 
first sense I mentioned, that of seeming, as when a stick, if placed in water, only appears 
to be bent but really is not. For the reasons I have given, however, I do not think this is 
the right way to understand Kant’s idea that the objective world is appearance. Although 
I do not think that Kant intended the objective world to be appearance in the sense of 
mere seeming, or illusion, I do think he intended it to be appearance in a more 
uncontroversial sense of seeming. We will approach Kant’s intention, I believe, if we 
understand appearing not as mere seeming, but as seeming in the rather uncontroversial 
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sense that the world must seem one way or another.33 In this uncontroversial sense, we 
do not contrast the world’s appearing one way or another to the world’s really being one 
way or another. For the world’s really being some way surely still appears to us as really 
being some way.  
It might be helpful here to indicate the distinction between what we could call the 
philosophical sense of appearance, as mere seeming, and the uncontroversial sense of 
appearance, as appearing one way or another, or, as showing up for us. The distinction 
can be illustrated by the example of the stick in water. The stick in water appears to be 
bent, in both the philosophical sense of mere seeming and the uncontroversial sense of 
appearing one way or another, and then later appears really not to be bent, in the 
uncontroversial sense of appearing one way or another. So both the stick’s appearing bent 
(in the philosophical sense) and the stick’s really not being bent appear to us (in the 
uncontroversial sense) as a way things are. The stick’s merely appearing bent appears to 
us as a way things are, albeit a false way. And the stick’s really not being bent appears to 
us as a way things are, in this case, as the way things truly are. That is, illusory states of 
affairs and genuine states of affairs appear to us, each in the same uncontroversial sense 
as appearing one way or another.  
And, in fact, both states of affairs must appear, if they are to be the states of 
affairs they are. The very idea of there being both a way things merely seem to be and a 
way things really are implies that both the way things merely seem to be and the way 
things really are can appear to us, in the uncontroversial sense. For if we are to be able to 
                                                
33 I think I am justified in suggesting this even though Kant repeatedly characterizes appearances as 
“mere.” For Kant invokes “mere” appearances usually in those contexts in which he wants to emphasize 
their difference from things in themselves, which transcendental realists, according to Kant, mistakenly 
claim are both the proper occupants of objective reality and the proper objects of knowledge. 
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make sense of the distinction between the way things merely seem to be and the way 
things really are, then we must be able to distinguish and refer to both the way things 
merely seem to be and the way things really are. We must be able to say: this is how 
things seemed but this is how things really are. If we cannot distinguish and refer to both 
states of affairs, then the distinction between the way things merely seem to be and the 
way things really are loses its piquancy.  
So in order to distinguish and refer to both how things merely seem to be and how 
things really are, both states of affairs must be able to appear to us. Another way of 
putting the point is to say that the distinction between how things merely seem to be and 
how things really are is a distinction that can obtain only within the realm of things that 
can appear. Something must be able to appear to us in order for us to be able to make 
false judgments about it and to make true judgments about it, that is, in order either to be 
mistaken or correct about the way things are. What can appear to us are objects; they are 
those things about which we are able to form either true or false judgments, “according as 
we are negligent or careful” in our judging.34 Since objective judgment depends upon 
objects possibly appearing to us about which we can form judgments, then it is only 
within the realm of possible appearances that objective judgment, and therefore 
knowledge of the way things really are, is possible.    
We should not, therefore, conceive of things in themselves as being the way 
things really are. For if we take the transcendental distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves as the distinction between how things seem to be and how things 
really are, we are assuming that the way things supposedly really are—the things in 
                                                
34 Prolegomena, pp. 31-32. 
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themselves—can be distinguished from the way things supposedly seem to be—the 
appearances. But, as I have argued, it only makes sense to distinguish between the way 
things seem to be and the way things really are when both states of affairs can appear to 
us. So because the things in themselves cannot appear to us, they cannot be distinguished 
from the way things merely seem to be. And if things in themselves cannot be 
distinguished from the way things merely seem to be, then they lose their status as the 
way things really are. Thus, things in themselves should not be taken as the way things 
really are. Rather, we should see that the way things really are, in order even to be the 
way things really are, must be able to appear to us.  
This is all to say that if we are able to represent an objective state of affairs, then 
it has appeared, and if an objective state of affairs has appeared, then we are able to 
represent it. Therefore, according to Kant, as I see him, objective reality must be 
appearance. For objective reality must be able to appear to us in the first place as 
something to which we can refer when we form judgments. Recalling, then, the notion of 
objective reference, which have I argued Kant’s theoretical project is mainly built around, 
we can say, first, that Kant believes that we must be able to refer to objects—they must 
be able to appear—if we are to be able to form objective judgments; second, that we must 
be able to form objective judgments if we are to be able to form objectively true 
judgments; and, third, that we must be able to form objectively true judgments if we are 
to be able to have knowledge. Knowledge is possible, therefore, only on the condition 
that objects can appear to us. And Kant’s theoretical project, I have argued, consists in 
explaining how it is possible for objects to appear to us. 
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When I say that objective reality, according to Kant, must be able to appear to us, 
I mean that objective reality must be able to appear to us in the uncontroversial sense of 
appearing one way or another. However, it is probably best to think of appearing, in this 
sense, as showing up for us in experience. This is because when something shows up for 
us in experience, our first reaction is to take it as something that is part of the wider 
objective world. To use an earlier example, when an old friend shows up at the door, we 
are not tempted to contrast her showing up at the door with some other, more real, state 
of affairs. Nor are we (seriously) tempted to think that she is a mere figment. She shows 
up at the door as a full-blooded part of objective reality. We do not wonder whether she is 
really there; we wonder how she came to be really there. It is in this sense, I have tried to 
demonstrate, that Kant thinks that objective reality shows up for us in experience. He 
does not question whether it does, but, rather, how it can. 
If objective reality, according to Kant, must be able to show up for us in 
experience, then objects must be those things which are able to show up for us in 
experience. But if, according to Kant, objects are defined as things that must be able to 
show up for us in experience, then we might wonder how this definition differs from a 
Berkeleian definition of objects as things that must be perceivable.35 It is worthwhile, 
therefore, to say something more about what Kant means when he says that an object 
must be able show up for us in experience, in order to demarcate his idea from 
Berkeley’s.   
The instructive point of contrast between Kant and Berkeley is how each deals 
with unperceived objects. According to Berkeley’s account of the minimum sensibile, to 
                                                
35 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in Philosophical Works, ed. by Michael 
Ayers (London: Dent, 1975). 
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be a possibly existing object is to be perceivable, and if something is too small to be 
perceivable, it is not a possibly existing object.36 In contrast to this, Kant believes that 
just because something is not perceivable, we do not thereby have license to proclaim 
that it is not a possibly existing object, for the possible existence of objects is not 
determined by their perceivability. Let me explain, using one of Kant’s own examples.  
About the perception of a hypothetical magnetic matter Kant says, 
Thus we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies 
from the perception of attracted iron filings, although an immediate 
perception of this matter is impossible for us given the constitution of our 
organs. For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of 
our perceptions we could also happen upon the immediate empirical 
intuition of it in an experience if our senses, the crudeness of which does 
not affect the form of possible experience in general, were finer. Thus 
wherever perception and whatever is appended to it in accordance with 
empirical laws reaches, there too reaches our cognition of the existence of 
things (A226/B273, my emphasis).  
 
Here, Kant claims that our perception of the movement of iron filings justifies the 
inference to the existence of an object—magnetic matter—that is responsible for the 
movement of the iron filings. Berkeley, on the other hand, would have to appeal to a 
being with more powerful senses, or to deny flatly the possible existence of the magnetic 
matter, since it is clearly beyond the minimum sensibile. If, however, we had a different 
minimum sensibile, we might, Berkeley would say, be able to perceive the magnetic 
matter. And only then, he would go on, would we be justified in saying that it exists.  
Against Berkeley, Kant claims that the possible existence of an object, and its 
showing up for us in experience, has nothing to do with the utterly contingent grain of 
our senses. If our senses happened to be finer, Kant says, we would perceive the magnetic 
matter. And, presumably, if our senses happened to be coarser, we would not perceive 
                                                
36 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge., §132. 
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even the iron filings. But all of that is incidental to the existence of, and our cognition of 
the existence of, the magnetic matter, the iron filings, or any other possible object. For 
what is required [for the cognition of possible objects] is only the progress 
from appearances to appearances, even if they should not yield any actual 
perception (if this perception is too weak in degree to become an 
experience for our consciousness), because despite this [the possible 
objects] would still belong to possible experience (A522/B550). 
 
Kant’s claim is that the magnetic matter’s possible existence, that is, its possibly showing 
up for us in experience, is neither necessarily connected to our actually perceiving the 
magnetic matter nor necessarily connected to our possibly perceiving the magnetic 
matter. Whether we can perceive an object does not decide whether that object is possible 
or can possibly show up for us in experience.  
 We can see that Kant believes that the possible perception of an object is not a 
criterion of that object’s possible existence. That is, the possible existence of an object 
has no necessary connection to the object’s perceivability. It is reasonable to ask, then, 
what Kant does say the possible existence of magnetic matter, or any other object, is 
connected to, if not to the object’s perceivability. As Kant suggests in the passage quoted 
above, at A226/B273, the possible existence of an object, and that object’s possibly 
showing up for us in experience, depends upon the object’s lawful connection to other 
objects that are able to show up for us. The hypothetical magnetic matter, or any other 
possible object, is able to show up for us in the sense that it is able to fit lawfully into the 
wider, experienceable, objective world. This coheres with the preliminary definition of 
Kantian objects that I gave earlier in this chapter. As I said there, and as I am saying here, 
something’s being a possible object, something’s being able to show up for us in 
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experience, depends upon its possible connection to other natural phenomena, and not 
necessarily upon its perceivability. 
   Therefore, when I say that, for Kant, objects must be able to show up for us in 
experience, or that objects are essentially representable, I am not saying, and Kant 
certainly is not saying, that objects must be perceived in order to be real. If Kant were to 
think that possible objects depend for their existence upon our being able to perceive 
them, then he would have to conclude, with Berkeley, that objects might be just mental 
items, or collections of sense data. And this conclusion would run afoul of Kant’s explicit 
aim to secure empirical realism, the idea that there really exists an objective world that 
we can come to know through experience (A370-371).  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to give an idea of what Kant’s project looks like when 
we understand it as essentially concerned with explaining the possibility of objective 
reference. I have argued that it is nearer to Kant’s intention to understand representing as 
above all a semantic activity rather than an epistemic one. That is, I think Kant is first of 
all concerned to show how it is possible for objects to show up for us in experience as 
things to know.  
I have put things this way because I think it helps us to remember that Kant is not 
denying the reality of the objective world, the world whose reality we are 
commonsensically tempted to accept. He is trying to explain the reality, and the 
knowability, of the objective world. It is difficult to remember this when Kant says that 
the objective world is “mere appearance.” And it will be difficult to remember when we 
consider, as we will in the next chapter, that Kant says that objects conform to cognition. 
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But we must try to remember that the discourse about mere appearances and cognition-
conformed objects originates in the mind of an empirical realist, someone who believes 
that there is an objectively real world that we can come to know through experience.  
Kant believes that the best way to be empirical realists, the best way to understand 
that the world we experience and know is an objectively real world, is to be 
transcendental idealists.37 As I have stated, my thesis is an attempt to understand why 
Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the best way to secure empirical realism. The 
answer to this question I think lies in the distinction Kant draws between two 
worldviews: transcendental idealism and transcendental realism. Kant distinguishes 
transcendental idealism from transcendental realism by saying that the latter, unlike the 
former, thinks that when we refer to objects, we refer to those objects as they are in 
themselves (A491/B519). This is another way of saying that transcendental realists think 
that objects do not conform to cognition (Bxvi).  
This confusion, Kant claims, forces the transcendental realist to conclude that we 
can never know whether our representations refer to objects, and this motivates all the 
familiar skeptical problems. Kant thinks that we can preclude the skepticism only if we 
can explain how our representations can refer to objects, and, as I have argued, his 
transcendental idealism is built, in part, to explain this possibility. The explanation of the 
possibility of objective reference consists in Kant's claim that objects must conform to 
cognition (Bxvi).  
The point of this is both to summarize and to indicate the direction I am heading. 
In the next chapter, I will try to figure out what Kant might mean when he says that 
                                                
37 See Prolegomena, p. 29, where Kant, urging that space must be transcendentally ideal, says, “In this and 
no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its propositions against 
all the chicaneries of shallow metaphysics.” 
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objects conforms to cognition, since that is supposed to explain the possibility of 
objective reference. In the final chapter, I try to figure out why transcendental realism, 
with its assumption that objects do not conform to cognition, supposedly fails to explain 
objective reference.              
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIVE REFERENCE 
 
Kant says that the possibility of representing really existing objects is explained 
by the fact that objects conform to cognition (Bxvi). In this chapter, I would like to 
explore what Kant might mean when he says that objects conform to cognition and to 
understand how objects conforming to cognition is supposed to explain the possibility of 
representing objects. 
In the first chapter, I argued that Kant sets out in his project to explain how it is 
possible for objective reality to show up for us in the first place as something about which 
we can form true and false judgments. I hope that putting things this way helps us to 
remember that Kant is trying to preserve the idea that there really exists an objective 
world that we can know as independent of our particular judgments about it. Part of my 
argument consists in noting that Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances 
and things in themselves should not be taken as the distinction between the way things 
merely seem to be and the way things really are. I suggest, rather, that we take Kant as 
saying that, in order for it to be objective, objective reality—the way things really are—
must possibly appear to us, for we must be able to distinguish between how things merely 
seem to be and how things really are, and to do that, both states of affairs must appear for 
us to refer to. Objective reality must possibly show up for us in experience, and then we 
can articulate particular judgments about it, some true, some false. The objective world, 
then, as Kant says, is the world of things that can appear.   
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I recognize that in attempting to make it more palatable, I risk trivializing Kant’s 
claim that the objective world is appearance. For we might say, “Yes, it would be odd 
indeed if objective reality did not appear to us in any way whatsoever—did not even 
appear, somehow, as ‘imperceptible in principle,’ like some quantum phenomena. And 
so, yes, in some minimal sense, objective reality must appear one way or another. But 
who would argue with that?”  
Now, if that were the only thing that Kant meant when he says that objective 
reality is appearance, then his claim might dissolve into triviality. And if Kant’s claim 
that the objective world is appearance were to dissolve into triviality, then the rest of his 
theoretical philosophy might follow. For Kant’s basic criticism of all metaphysics before 
him—that it confuses objects, things that appear, with things in themselves, things that do 
not (A491/B519)—is a cornerstone of Kant’s belief that transcendental idealism, not 
transcendental realism, is the best way to secure empirical realism, the idea that there is a 
really existing objective world which we can come to know through experience. So if 
there were little substance to the claim that the objective reality we can know is 
appearance, then there would be little substance to the claim that metaphysics hitherto has 
mistaken mere appearances for things in themselves.38 
But I do not think I have trivialized Kant’s claim. For, as I have said, his critical 
project depends upon his distinction between appearances and things in themselves. 
Kant’s claim that the objective world is appearance has a corollary that the supposedly 
trivialized version does not: that along with the notion of appearances comes the notion 
of things in themselves (A251-252). What I am saying, then, is that it would be difficult 
                                                
38 Again, “mere” qualifies “appearances” in the service of emphatically distinguishing knowable 
appearances from unknowable things in themselves, not in the service of degrading appearances vis-à-vis 
things in themselves (Cf. B69). 
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to trivialize Kant’s claim that the objective world is appearance, precisely because that 
claim will always carry with it the notion that appearances are to be distinguished from 
things in themselves.39 So, yes, it may be easy to accept that the objective world must 
appear to us in one way or another if it is to be the objective world. But the objective 
world, on Kant’s view, will always be defined, in some sense, by what it is not, namely, 
the things in themselves. Yet, of course, as I have tried to demonstrate, this does not 
imply that when the objective world does show up for us, we are thereby missing out on 
the really real. For the world that shows up for us, according to Kant, is objective reality.  
Thus, I hope that instead of enervating Kant’s claim that objective reality is 
appearance, I have vivified it by situating it in a certain picture of Kant’s project, a 
picture according to which: first, Kant believes that our representations can and do refer 
to really existing objects; second, Kant’s principal aim is to explain how it is possible for 
our representations to refer to really existing objects; and, third, Kant’s explanation of the 
possibility of such reference begins with his recognizing that objective reality must show 
up for us in the first place if we are to be able to refer to it. (I will need to elaborate just 
how Kant thinks objective reality can show up for us in the first place, but for now, it is 
enough to say that he thinks it must.) I hope, that is, that I have gone some way toward 
making Kant’s claim that objective reality is appearance into a declaration of empirical 
                                                
39 And it will do so regardless of some attempts to sanitize Kant’s transcendental idealism by ignoring the 
thing in itself. Cf. John McDowell, in Mind and World: “But Kant also has a transcendental story, and in 
the transcendental perspective . . . receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible 
reality, a reality that is supposed to be independent of our conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any 
that fits the ordinary empirical world. If we restrict ourselves to the standpoint of experience itself [instead 
of the entire transcendental perspective], what we find in Kant is precisely the picture I have been 
recommending . . . . As I said, if we abstract from the role of the supersensible in Kant’s thinking, we are 
left with a picture in which reality is not located outside a boundary that encloses the conceptual. [My] 
picture is not offensive to common sense, but precisely protective of it” (pp. 41-44). 
 36 
realism, an affirmation of the idea that the objects that show up for us are real and can be 
known.    
Of course, the reasonableness of the foregoing depends upon what sorts of object 
Kant says can show up for us. As I have said, according to Kant, those sorts of object that 
can appear are those that conform to cognition. But what sorts of object are these? Rather 
than enumerating the general characteristics that an object must have in order to appear, I 
think it would be most helpful to address the prior question of what it might mean 
generally for objects to conform to cognition. For appreciating what it means for objects 
to conform to cognition is important for understanding why Kant thinks that his 
transcendental idealism is the best way to explain how we are able to represent really 
existing objects. Indeed, Kant thinks that transcendental realism’s failure to give us a 
satisfying account of how we can represent really existing objects consists precisely in 
transcendental realism’s failure to acknowledge that objective reality conforms to 
cognition. In sum, my reason for asking what it means for objective reality to conform to 
cognition is this: Kant’s criticism of transcendental realism, a criticism that I will explore 
in my third chapter, is that it does not appreciate that objective reality must conform to 
cognition, yet it is unclear what is supposed to be understood when one does understand 
that objective reality conforms to cognition. And so I will devote this chapter to an 
exploration of what Kant might mean when he says that objective reality conforms to 
cognition.  
First of all, whatever it does mean, Kant makes it clear that the idea that objective 
reality conforms to cognition is the whole secret of metaphysics, the solution to the 
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question of how to guarantee the referential bond between representations and real 
objects. As Kant tells us in the Preface to the Second Edition, 
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the 
objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through 
concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, 
come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with 
the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to 
our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of 
an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about 
objects before they are given to us (Bxvi-xvii). 
 
As I have said, we need to ask what it means to say that objects must conform to 
cognition. It will be helpful to begin, however, by elaborating exactly what it does not 
mean to say that objects must conform to cognition.  
Kant says that “there are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation 
and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet 
each other: Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the 
representation alone makes the object possible” (A92/B125). As far as I can gather—
from Kant’s letter of February 21, 1772 to Marcus Herz, from the Criticism of the Fourth 
Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology (A367-A381), and from the first paragraph of 
the Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, the first few lines of 
which I quote just above—Kant thinks that there are, historically, two ways that the 
object has been understood to make the representation possible and two ways that the 
representation has been understood to make the object possible. The two ways that the 
object has been understood to make the representation possible are, first, by the object 
acting as the efficient cause of which the representation is the effect and, second, by the 
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object acting as the archetypal cause of which the representation is the ectypal effect.40 
Correlatively, the two ways that the representation alone has been understood to make the 
object possible are, first, by the representation acting as the efficient cause of which the 
object is the effect, and, second, by the representation acting as the archetypal cause of 
which the object is the ectypal effect.   
Given these choices, Kant espouses the view that representation makes objects 
possible. This is part of what it means, we must assume, for objects to conform to 
cognition. But Kant will conclude that the representation makes the object possible 
neither by acting as an efficient cause nor by acting as an archetypal cause. Instructive for 
my purposes in this chapter are the reasons why Kant rejects the efficient and archetypal 
causal explanations and the ways in which he modulates the view that representation 
makes the object possible. Therefore, I will run through all of the historically available 
ways that are thought to secure the bond between representations and their objects. I will 
then discuss Kant’s way of securing the bond.  
 Let me first ask after the two ways in which the object can make the 
representation possible. In the first of these two cases, the object is the efficient cause of 
the representation. In this case, we can see how it could happen that a representation 
could be connected to what it is supposed to represent, how it would come into existence 
as a representation of its object: there could be a causal chain uniting the effect, the 
representation, to the efficient cause, the object. But two problems arise in this case. First, 
there is no reason that an effect should resemble its efficient cause, yet there is some 
                                                
40 Archetype and ectype are Kant’s terms, as used in his letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772. As I 
will explain later, they refer to a prototype and its copy, respectively.  
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sense in which a representation is supposed to resemble what it represents, whether the 
resemblance be spatial, temporal, analogical, or whatever.    
Second, if the only connection between representations and objects were causal, 
then we would be able, from our representations of them, only to infer the existence of 
real objects as the efficient cause of our representations of those same objects. And an 
inference from a representation as effect to its object as cause is a weak inference, since 
the representation could have been caused by, for example, faulty neurological 
connections, rather than the object to which the representation is supposed to refer.41 As 
Kant notes in the beginning of the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism,  
the inference from a given effect [the representation, for example] to its 
determinate cause [the object, for example] is always uncertain, since the 
effect can have arisen from more that one cause. Accordingly, in the 
relation of perception [that is, representation] to its cause, it always 
remains doubtful whether this cause is internal or external, thus whether 
all so-called outer perceptions [representations of external objects] are not 
a mere play of our inner sense, or whether they are related to actual 
external objects as their causes (A368). 
 
Given a representation, as effect, there is no way to ensure that its efficient cause is the 
object the representation purportedly refers to, rather than, say, “a mere play” of our 
minds. Therefore, if, as I argued in my first chapter, representations are ways for us to get 
in cognitive touch with objective reality—ways for objects to be given us—and if our 
only way to get in cognitive touch with objective reality were by inferring from a 
representation as effect to its object as cause, then it is difficult to see how representations 
would necessarily get us in cognitive touch with objective reality, as something about 
which we can make true and false judgments. What is needed, Kant thinks, is a necessary 
connection between our representations and the objects to which they refer. For if we 
                                                
41 Of course, this depends upon the idea that causes are sufficient conditions—one among many ideas of 
what causes might be.  
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cannot be sure that our representations refer to objects, then we cannot be sure that our 
judgments will be objective, because we cannot be sure that our representations are 
giving us objects about which we form judgments. What Kant is saying, I believe, is that 
a merely causal connection to objective reality does not ensure the desired semantic 
connection to objective reality.42 But even further, it is not only the case that the 
inference from our representation as effect to its object as cause is a weak inference. It is 
undesirable that an inference has to be made at all. Recall that Kant assumes the truth of 
empirical realism, which “grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which need not be 
inferred, but is immediately perceived” (A371, my emphasis). But if an object were 
merely the efficient cause of its representation, then the reality of that object could only 
be inferred, and empirical realism would be false, an altogether un-Kantian result.     
 The second of the two ways in which the object alone can make the representation 
possible is the case in which the object is the archetypal cause and the representation is 
the object’s ectypal effect. The terminology is odd, but we can think of archetypes as 
prototypes and ectypes as copies of the prototype. In this case, then, the representation is 
supposed to be a copy of the object. We can, in this case, see how a representation could, 
in one way or another, resemble the object it purports to refer to. But there are a couple of 
things wrong with this idea. First, the idea that representations are copies of objects 
misses the fact that the objects that show up for us in experience always show up for us in 
                                                
42 In “Non-reductive physicalism,” from Pragmatism, Objectivity, and Truth: Philosophical Papers 
Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Richard Rorty recommends that we 
countenance only causal commerce between bodies of belief and the external environment. If non-reductive 
physicalism were true, then we could not preclude brain-in-a-vat and Matrix-type scenarios, since, as Kant 
points out, we could not ensure that the object we purport to have beliefs about was causing those beliefs. 
What is more, if objects were merely the causes of our beliefs, it is hard to see how our beliefs would mean 
anything. In Mind and World, John McDowell expresses this latter concern by noting that Donald 
Davidson, an arch non-reductive physicalist, “helps himself to a body of [meaningful] beliefs” (p. 68), yet 
cannot, within his own non-reductive physicalism, say how those beliefs come to be meaningful in the first 
place.    
 41 
a certain way. This means that we do not automatically know everything about the object 
when it shows up for us. If everything about the object were given when we represent it, 
the point of judgment, that is, of further determination, would be lost. Moreover, when an 
object shows up for us in experience, more than just the particular object shows up for us. 
That is, when we represent an object, it shows up for us not only as an instance of a wider 
kind, but also as an instance of a kind which, at least possibly, has its lawful place in the 
wider objective world. This follows from how I characterized Kant’s notion of object and 
objective reality in my first chapter, but it is also supported by what Kant says at 
A582/B610, that “nothing is an object for us unless it presupposes the sum total of 
empirical reality as condition of its possibility.” Thus, when we represent objects, we get 
both less and more, in a sense, than we would were our representations mere copies of 
their objects.  
The second thing wrong with the idea that our representations are copies is that 
we risk construing representing as a merely passive reaction to objects, when, according 
to Kant, the representation of objects, and also the full-fledged knowledge of them, 
necessarily involves the spontaneity of the understanding, as well as the receptivity of the 
sensibility (A50/B74). The representation of objects is spontaneous insofar as when an 
object has shown up for us in experience, we have already, in a minimal way, made sense 
of the object by “ordering different representations under a common one” (A68/B93). 
The “different representations” here would be of an object’s different properties, and the 
“common” representation would be a unified representation of an object as a unified 
object. The object that appears has already been unified by our cognitive activity into an 
object; we are, in some manner, as knowers, responsible for the ways in which objects 
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show up for us in experience.43 The difficulty, of course, is to understand how we can be 
responsible both for real objects and to real objects as independently existing things about 
which we form judgments. But of all that there will be more later. For now, it should be 
enough to note that the idea that representing real objects is a matter of passive copying 
fails to capture both the extent to which, according to Kant, representing and judging are 
activities and the extent to which representing an object gives us more and less than the 
particular object itself.         
 Now, there are two ways in which the representation can make the object 
possible, the first due to the fact that the representation is the efficient cause of which the 
object is the effect and the second due to the fact that the representation is the archetypal 
cause of which the object is the ectypal effect. Each of these two cases gets the direction 
of the relation right—representations in some sense making objects possible—but they do 
not get the character of the relation right. For both cases suppose that the representation 
is the cause of its object. In the first case, where the representation is supposed to be the 
lawfully efficient cause of the object, we can see the necessary “coming together” of the 
representation and its object, since, ceteris paribus, given the representation as cause, its 
object as effect obtains.44 But there are two things wrong with this idea. First, it is 
difficult to see how the representation, as the cause of its object, could, in any sense, be a 
representation of the object. Presumably, the representation of an object depends for its 
aboutness upon being responsive to its object. Second, if the representation were the only 
cause of its object, then the knowledge based on this representation would be, according 
to Kant’s definition, not theoretical but practical knowledge. For, unlike theoretical 
                                                
43 This is not, of course, an invitation to view objects as mere subjective constructions. Kant intends the 
Transcendental Deduction to show that unified objects are necessary conditions of unified subjects.  
44 Once again, this depends upon the idea that causes are sufficient conditions. 
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knowledge, which depends upon its objects in some sense being given from elsewhere, 
practical knowledge brings its objects into actuality (Bix-x), as when my practical 
knowledge that my health is a good thing to attain actually works to bring my health—the 
object of my practical knowledge—into existence.45    
In the second case, where the representation is supposed to be the prototype of 
which the object is the copy, we can see how a necessary relation of representation to its 
object would obtain: The objects, as copies, necessarily resemble the representations. 
But, as I noted above, it is difficult to understand, if the objects were copies of our 
representations, in what sense our representations would be responsive to, and thus 
representations of, the objects. But further, we are, Kant says, finite, discursive knowers, 
which means that we bring objective reality into view by mobilizing concepts (A68/B93). 
If, by the mere act of conceptualizing, or representing, we could make copies, that is, 
objects, then we would not in fact be discursive knowers at all. We would be divine 
knowers. For a divine intellect, knowing and creating are the same. A divine intellect is 
not one which would “represent given objects, [but one] through whose representation 
the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced” (B145). Since we 
have discursive intellects, objects cannot be the copies of our representations.   
  Let us look back at where we have been. We are trying to narrow down what it 
means for objective reality to conform to cognition, for the reason that objective reality’s 
conforming to cognition is, Kant believes, how we are able to explain the possibility of 
representing real objects. To get an idea of why Kant believes objective reality conforms 
to cognition, I have considered four influential alternatives mentioned by Kant, each of 
                                                
45 For a fruitful explication of this idea, see Stephen Engstrom, “Kant’s Distinction Between Theoretical 
and Practical Knowledge,” Harvard Review of Philosophy, X, 2002, pp. 49-63. The example is Engstrom’s. 
 44 
which were supposed to explain the possibility of representing objects. I have shown why 
Kant rejects each of these alternatives. Representations can be neither mere causes nor 
mere effects of objects, and objects can be neither mere prototypes nor mere copies of 
representations. But of the two general means to secure the possibility of objective 
reference, by representations making their objects possible or by objects making their 
representations possible, Kant in fact claims that only the former can explain the 
possibility of representing real objects. So there must be some other way, beyond 
efficient and archetypal causation, for representations to make their objects possible.       
As I indicated, Kant’s revolutionary claim is that the way that representations can 
make their objects possible is if objects conform to cognition. If what I have said above is 
correct, then the idea that objects conform to cognition can mean neither that objects are 
copies of their representations nor that representations are the efficient causes of their 
objects. This is because only for a divine intellect is the representation of an object at the 
same time the creation of the object, and only in the case of discursive, practical 
knowledge can a representation bring its object into actuality. And it is difficult, in either 
case, to see how the representation would be a (theoretical) representation of the object.    
It is here that we encounter what might be termed the standard model of what 
Kant means when he says that objects must conform to cognition.46 The standard model 
is meant to explain, as the archetypal and efficient causal models cannot, how 
representations can refer to real objects. And it follows Kant in drawing a distinction 
between the form and the matter of the objects that show up for us, and goes on, again 
                                                
46 See, for example, the editors’ introduction to Kant in Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann, eds., 
Philosophic Classics, Volume III: Modern Philosophy, 3rd ed.  (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 448-
449. 
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following Kant, to suggest that our cognitive capacities determine the form for objects, 
while the objects’ matter is supplied from elsewhere (Bx).  
From here, however, the standard model has a tendency to morph into a metaphor 
that, though simple and therefore useful for first getting a grip on Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, is too coarse to capture the fineness of Kant’s solution to the secret of 
metaphysics. Often, we take the standard model, apply the transcendental distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves, and go on to suggest that things in 
themselves are the matter which our concepts form, or shape, or mold, into the objects 
that appear to us. This, it is supposed, is what Kant means when he says that objects must 
conform to cognition: Our concepts shape some given, amorphous stuff—the things in 
themselves—into the objects that appear to us. It is this sort of view that Jacques Barzun 
seems to have in mind when he writes, for example, that “Kant posited a mind that acts 
like a waffle iron on batter.”47   
As evocative and easy to understand as it may be, however, the waffle iron 
metaphor is misleading. In the first place, there is a clear disanalogy between things in 
themselves and things like batter, namely, things in themselves are supposed not to have 
spatiotemporal properties, while things like batter obviously have spatiotemporal 
properties like texture, temperature, color, and so on. On the standard model, 
spatiotemporal properties are part of objective reality’s form. If things in themselves are 
supposed to be our batter, then we would have to imagine our batter to be extensionless, 
textureless, temperatureless, colorless, etc.  
                                                
47 Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2000), p. 508. 
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The waffle iron advocate could perhaps try to salvage the metaphor by suggesting 
that we could simply subtract properties, one by one, from the batter. But if we did that, it 
would be hard to say what we were supposed to be shaping when we represent—shape—
objects. Now, the idea of concepts shaping reality denotes a two-term causal relation, but 
if one of the relata lacks its referent, then the relation, and thus the idea, lacks good sense. 
So, in the second place, the waffle iron version of the standard model falters because it 
presumably cannot tell us what, in Kant’s scheme, our concepts are supposed to shape. It 
cannot give us the direct object that would complete our transitive verb. Furthermore, if 
we cannot say what it is we are supposed to shape, then we might as well conclude also 
that things in themselves should not be identified with some substantial but shapeless 
reality which, once we lay hold of it and shape it according to our concepts, finds itself in 
the overall composition of objects of our experience and knowledge, the way the batter 
finds itself in the waffle. Kant surely understood that things in themselves, which we 
cannot know, are not some kind of substance.  
In the third place, the idea of a shapeless reality that awaits conceptual shaping 
suggests that the shapeless reality can be shaped in a variety of arbitrary and possibly 
irreconcilable ways. Even if there were—and Kant thinks there is not—some “subjective 
necessity” (B168) dictating that any discursive knower must shape the shapeless stuff in 
such-and-such a way, there would still be nothing to make the supposed “subjective 
necessity” at all necessary, for the subjective necessity would still be arbitrarily 
implanted (B167). The idea that reality can be shaped variously, arbitrarily, and 
incommensurably can lead, therefore, to a subjectivism according to which particular 
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claims, pretending to objectivity, cannot be adjudicated.48 And this, Kant says, “is 
precisely what the skeptic wishes most” (B168). But Kant certainly does not intend to 
give the skeptics what they want most.    
But there is something else wrong with the waffle iron metaphor, a problem that 
would remain whether or not we can save the analogy between thing-in-itself and batter, 
find a direct object for our transitive verb, or contort Kant’s intentions. What is wrong 
with the waffle iron notion is that it is a causal notion.  
Shaping things in themselves into objects would be a causal process. But on 
Kant’s view, causal relations obtain only within the realm of appearances. There can be 
no causal commerce across the transcendental divide, between appearances and things in 
themselves. It is for this reason, too, that the so-called problem of affection arises. The 
problem of affection is that things in themselves are supposed by Kant to “affect the mind 
in a certain way” (A19/B33) or to be the “cause” (A288/B344) of the appearances. But 
only objects that have already appeared are subject to causal determination. The problem 
of affection is a widely discussed problem in Kant scholarship, but I will not discuss it in 
any depth here.49 I bring it up because it is a well-known problem, and I want to use its 
notoriety to point out that it is the converse of the problem that I now address. That is, if 
there is a question as to how things in themselves could in any way cause appearances, 
there must be a question as to how our concepts can cause, or in any way manipulate, 
                                                
48 In “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” from Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), Donald Davidson demonstrates that the idea of radically incommensurable 
conceptual schemes, an idea presupposed by claims of extreme subjectivism and relativism, is incoherent. 
Along the way, and perhaps tacitly admonishing Kant, Davidson abolishes the duality of mental items that 
shape and stuff that is shaped. Since I am sure that Kant did not intend his Copernican turn to mean that we 
shape things in themselves into objects, then I am sure that Kant’s transcendental idealism can 
accommodate Davidson’s basic conclusion, which is that conceptual disagreement presupposes a common 
conceptual grip on the world.  
49 Henry Allison analyzes the problem in Chapter Three of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and points the 
reader to the body of work on the problem. Allison argues that affection is not necessarily a causal notion. 
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things in themselves to make objects. For, according to Kant, as I have said, things in 
themselves cannot enter into any causal relations, as cause or as effect.   
What Kant has in mind when he says that objects conform to cognition must, 
therefore, be something quite different. Indeed, we should remember that Kant says that 
objects must conform to cognition, which means that what conforms to cognition are 
things that have already shown up for us, not things that have yet to show up for us. It 
cannot be the case that when we represent an object, we have brought a thing in itself into 
objecthood.  So we should not be led to think that the waffle iron metaphor captures what 
Kant intends by his Copernican turn. The standard model, however, not taken to its 
waffle iron extremes, does partly capture what Kant intends.  
Again, the standard model says that the objects that show up for us have a form 
and a matter and that we determine the form while the matter comes from elsewhere. We 
can, following tradition, think of the form of something as the something’s most general 
and minimal definition, taking “definition” in the sense of a clear, sharp demarcation of 
that something’s essential features. The form of an object, then, would be its essence, the 
minimal features it must have to be an object at all. But what would the matter of objects 
be? If I am right about what I said above, then we should try not to think of the matter of 
objects as stuff, as a sort of noumenal substrate that awaits molding. Rather, we should, 
following Kant, identify the matter of objects with their sheer existence (A92/B125). 
It is reasonable to ask whether we are really following Kant when we identify 
matter and sheer existence. The matter of an object, historically, has not been understood 
as that object’s sheer existence. Consider a passage I referred to earlier, one in which 
Kant contrasts theoretical and practical knowledge. Kant says that “cognition can relate 
 49 
to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the object . . . or else also 
making the object actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical cognition of 
reason” (Bx). In this passage, Kant suggests that the case in which cognition merely 
determines its object is different from the case in which cognition both determines and 
makes actual its object. There is a difference, when we represent objects, between 
determining the objects we represent and bringing into existence the objects we represent. 
In theoretical cognition, that is, in mathematical and scientific cognition, we do not make 
the objects actual when we represent them. “[R]epresentation in itself,” Kant says, “does 
not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned” (A92/B125). Returning to 
Kant’s distinction between objective reality’s form and matter, where the former is what 
we are supposed to determine and the latter is what is supposed to be supplied from 
elsewhere, we can conclude that what we determine is objective reality’s form—its 
general, essential features—and what is supplied from elsewhere is objective reality’s 
sheer existence.   
Some questions arise here. We understand that we do not determine objective 
reality with respect to its sheer existence, but we still do not know what it means to 
determine objective reality with respect to its form. And we understand what Kant does 
not mean when he says that objects conform to cognition, but we have yet to answer, 
positively, the question of what he does mean when he says that objects conform to 
cognition. What is more, we do not yet know how objective reality’s conforming to 
cognition is supposed to explain the possibility of representing objective reality. Now, I 
think that if we first address this last question, that of how objective reality’s conforming 
to cognition is supposed to explain the possibility of objective meaningfulness, then it 
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will remind us why, in the first place, we are talking about determining objective reality 
with respect to its form. Then, eventually, I hope to clarify what Kant might mean when 
he says that we determine objective reality with respect to its form.  
Kant states in one sentence, albeit an epigrammatic one, what turns out to be the 
whole secret of metaphysics, the solution to the problem of explaining objective 
reference: “The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same 
time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience” (A111).50 The way I have 
been putting things, this means that the conditions that define the way objects show up 
for us in and through experience are the very same conditions that define the objects that 
show up for us in and through experience. These conditions, however, are not conditions 
for the actuality of representations and objects. For, if we recall, representations do not 
determine, or condition, objects with respect to their sheer existence. Rather, the 
conditions are conditions for the possibility of representations and objects. As Kant says 
in the quoted passage at A111, the conditions for a possible experience, or representation, 
of objects are at the same time the conditions for the possibility of the objects of 
experience, or representation. So the idea is that the conditions that make it possible to 
represent objects, that make it possible for objects to show up for us, are, identically, the 
conditions that make those objects possible.    
It will be instructive here to invoke, once again, the transcendental distinction 
between things that show up for us—objects, objective reality—and things that do not—
things in themselves. As I argued in my first chapter, things in themselves cannot be 
objectively real, in any full-blooded sense, because they do not show up for us. Let me 
                                                
50 See also A158/B197. 
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put this in terms of possibility conditions. Objects are things that satisfy the conditions 
for the possibility of showing up for us, and things in themselves are things that do not 
satisfy the conditions for the possibility of showing up for us. But this just means, as I 
have argued, that things in themselves are not possible objects. That is, if something 
cannot show up for us, then it cannot be objectively real, and if something cannot be 
objectively real, then it cannot show up for us. Equivalently, then, we can say that 
something can be a really existing object if and only if it can show up for us. Thus we 
have had all along the beginning of a definition of objects, one minimal feature that 
objects in general must have if they are to be objects at all: To be an object is to be able 
to appear to us.     
Now we will be able to see how Kant’s identification of the conditions for the 
possibility of representation with the conditions for the possibility of objects is supposed 
to secure the possibility of representing the objectively real. The conditions under which 
it is possible for an object to appear to us are the conditions under which it is possible for 
an object to be an object at all, which means that if something has appeared to us, then it 
is already, simply in virtue of its having appeared to us, a possibly real object.51 Possibly 
existing objects, and, by extension, actually existing objects, are necessarily able to be 
represented; it will never be the case that an object actually exists which we cannot place 
before us in a certain way. And if it is impossible for there to be a really existing object 
                                                
51 One might reasonably wonder how a possible object can appear. We should note what Kant says it 
means, generally, for an object to show up for us. He says, “To give an object . . . is nothing other than to 
relate its representation to experience (whether this be actual or possible)” (A155/B194). Because the 
notions of possible appearance and possible object are so tightly connected, I risk circularity here, but let 
me just say, following Kant, that a possible object can appear if we can say what its appearing would be 
like. Thus, for example, the aether appeared. For we had a handful of identity conditions; we knew how it 
might fit in lawfully with other objects that we experience. But though the aether was and remains a 
possible object, it turns out, by dint of experience, not to be actual.  
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that we cannot represent, then the possibility of representing really existing objects is 
secured. Objective reality will always be able, at the very least, possibly to appear to us.        
Of course, this does not mean that objective reality must be represented in order to 
be objective reality, only that it must possibly be represented. Kant aims only to secure 
the possibility, in the first place, of representing any object at all, actual or possible, and 
he does this, if I am right, by arguing that one of the essential features of objective reality 
is that it is able to show up for us in and through experience. And this is how Kant 
intends to explain the possibility of representing objective reality.  
There are other, and more specific, essential features of objective reality besides 
its representability. I enumerated some in my first chapter. But one of the most concise 
definitions of Kant’s notion of objective reality comes from Gordon G. Brittan, Jr.52 
Brittan says that, according to Kant, the objective world is “a world having a particular 
spatial-temporal-causal form that contains enduring centers of attractive and repulsive 
forces.”53 Any object that appears, that is, any possibly real object, will assume this 
definition. Objects must be able to be located in space and time, and must be able to push 
back and get pulled away, and to do so lawfully.54 This is objective reality’s form. But 
since the conditions for the possibility of objective reality are at the same time the 
conditions for the possibility of our representing objective reality, it is also the general 
way objective reality will appear to us in and through experience. We determine objective 
                                                
52 Kant’s Philosophy of Science. 
53 Ibid., p. 21. According to the Transcendental Deduction, objects must have a determinable location in 
space and time, for their being objects depends upon their being somewhere and somewhen other than 
where and when I am. Further, my being a subject of experiences depends upon objects being elsewhere 
and elsewhen. And according to the Analogies of Experience, the causal determination of the world helps 
to establish the distinction between a succession of subjective perceptions and a succession of objective 
states of affairs. See Chapters 6 and 7 in Brittan (op. cit.) for a helpful discussion.   
54 This means that objective reality must obey some causal laws, not that it must obey the causal laws it 
now obeys.  
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reality with respect to its form, and not its existence, then, in the sense that any possible 
experience or representation we can have of an object will have this form, and so will any 
possible object that we can experience or represent, regardless of whether the object is 
actual. Thus, analogous to the way that we are assured that we can represent really 
existing objects because really existing objects must be representable, in virtue of their 
being objects, we are assured that we can represent objective reality because a spatially-
temporally-causally arranged world of objects is the only general kind of world that we 
can represent, but, if Kant is right, it is also the only general kind of world that there can 
be (A93/B125).  
So I hope that we now understand how the fact that we determine reality is 
supposed to explain the possibility of representing really existing objects, and that we 
have an idea of what it means for us to determine objective reality with respect to its 
form. But in what sense do we determine objective reality? About our determining 
objects, Kant says that “the representation is still determinant of the object a priori if it is 
possible through it alone to cognize something as an object” (A92/B125). There seem to 
be at least three senses here, now that we have cleared away the more prominent 
misconceptions, in which Kant says that we determine objective reality. The first sense in 
which Kant seems to suggest that we determine objective reality is that through our 
representing, which always assumes an objective character, we can only bring into view a 
reality that has an objective character. The second sense, which stresses the a priori 
aspect of our representations, is that because the form of experience is the form of the 
world, we are able to know, prior to any particular experience of an object or of objective 
reality, the general features of that object or of objective reality, and we can do this 
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simply by reflecting on the general features of the way in which objects show up for us in 
experience. That is, based on the form of our experience of the objective world, we can 
determine, prior to any particular experience, the form of the objective world. The third 
sense in which Kant seems to suggest that we determine objective reality is that because 
our peculiar cognitive activities represent objective reality in a certain way, objective 
reality must therefore be that certain way.   
We should note that all three of the above senses seem to get at what Kant intends 
by his Copernican turn. For if through the representation alone we are able a priori to 
know something as an object, then surely it must mean, first, that we are able only to 
represent a certain kind of world, namely an objective one; second, that it is only by 
reflecting on the form of experience that we can know the form of objective reality; and 
third, that we are able, because of how we represent, to ensure that objective reality must 
be a certain way. All of these senses, then, capture what Kant intends.  
At the same time, however, all of these senses of determination might be 
supposed to be objectionably anthropocentric. For what should the character of objective 
reality have to do with the way that we represent it? The worry is legitimate, since Kant is 
trying to justify empirical realism, the idea that the world we can represent is a really 
existing, independent world. But I think there is a way of understanding our 
determination of objective reality that is faithful to the three senses of determination, that 
coheres with the rest of what I have said so far, and that does not imply anything too 
objectionably anthropocentric.  
The first sense—the idea that we can, because of the character of our 
representations, only bring into view a reality of an objective character—is right as far as 
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it goes, as long as we remember that it is the character of our representations that allows 
us only to bring into view a nomologically possible reality of a necessarily objective 
character. Our representations allow us, necessarily, only to refer to possible objects and, 
if reality obliges, to actual ones. We should also make sure that we are not bewitched by 
the “only,” which is akin to the “mere” in “mere appearances.” The objective world that 
shows up for us is indeed the only world that can show up for us, the only world our 
representations allow into view, but we are not, I hope I have shown, therefore missing 
out on the really real. We are just referring to the only things we could ever refer to. And 
even though it is the case that our representations allow us "only" to refer to a certain 
kind of reality, we should also keep in mind that the "only" kind of reality that our 
representations allow us to refer to is an objective reality. Representations give us objects 
so that we can make objective judgments (A155/B194).  
Regarding the second sense, since Kant identifies the conditions for the possibility 
of representation, or experience, with the conditions for the possibility of objects, the fact 
that we can inspect the way objects show up for us in experience and determine by that 
inspection what the objects we experience must be like may do nothing more than point 
up the fact that we are finite, discursive, and sensuous knowers who can come to know 
something about objective reality only through representation, or experience. Here is 
what I mean. Imagine things the other way around, as if we could, instead of inspecting 
the general features of experience in order to draw conclusions about objective reality, 
somehow inspect the general features of objective reality in order to draw conclusions 
about our experience. In that case, we would be able to enumerate the general features 
that any representation or experience must have, given the general features of objective 
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reality—on the condition, of course, that the general features of experience are just the 
general features of the world. But this cannot be the case, since we are finite, discursive, 
sensuous knowers. We cannot inspect anything except through experience. As Kant says 
in the opening sentence of his Introduction to the Critique’s B Edition, all of our 
knowledge, including, presumably, transcendental knowledge, begins with experience 
(B1). This not only means that we cannot bring objects into view except through 
experience, it means that we cannot reflect upon the general features of objective reality 
except through reflection upon the general features of our experience of objective reality. 
Our lot is to get at things by way of experience. Without the possibility of experience of 
objective reality, we, as finite, discursive, sensuous knowers, could not draw any 
conclusions about objective reality or its general features. But since experience is 
possible, and if Kant is right that the conditions that make it possible for us to experience 
objects are the same conditions that make objects possible, then we are able to draw 
conclusions, based on the character of our experience, about the character of objective 
reality. This is not necessarily anthropocentric, since the conditions for the possibility of 
experience, which are the conditions for the possibility of objects, are not necessarily 
human conditions. Kant’s argument is that given these general features of our experience 
of objective reality, these conditions must obtain. This does not imply that we or our 
minds have anything to do with the obtaining of the conditions.55 
The same sort of consideration can apply to the third sense in which we may be 
said to determine objective reality, the idea that objective reality must be the way it is 
because that is the way our representations are. For since Kant identifies the form of 
                                                
55 As Brittan points out, Kant does not give a separate argument, over and above his “quasi-psychological 
suggestions,” for the conclusion that the conditions lie permanently “in the mind.” See Kant’s Theory of 
Science, pp. 26-27. 
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representation with the form of the world, we can just as well say that our representations 
must be the way they are because that is the way objective reality is. The conditions for 
the possibility of representation and the conditions for the possibility of objects are the 
same conditions, so representations and objects each must be the way they are because of 
the other. Again, this does not imply an anthropocentrism, for Kant’s argument is that 
given these general features of our experience of objective reality, these conditions must 
obtain, and we do not necessarily have a say in the obtaining of these conditions. 
To summarize, then, let me say that, according to Kant, as I see him, we 
determine objective reality in the senses: first, that we are able to represent only a certain 
kind of reality, namely, an objective one; second, that we are able to inspect the general 
features of objective reality only by inspecting the general features of our representations 
of it; and third, that because our representations of objective reality have certain general 
features, we are assured that objective reality will have those general features. None of 
these senses is objectionably anthropocentric if we remember that our determining 
objective reality just means that the conditions that make it possible for us to represent 
objective reality are identical with the conditions that make it possible for objective 
reality to be objective reality. That is, if any possible representation has certain general 
features, then any possible object must have those features, and if any possible object has 
certain general features, then any possible representation must have those features.   
In emphasizing the identity of the conditions for the possibility of representation 
with the conditions for the possibility of objects, saying, in effect, that representations 
and objects each must be the way they are because of the other, it may seem that I am 
again trivializing Kant. For putting things this way seems to gloss over the radicality of 
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Kant’s shift in perspective, from the precritical view that cognition conforms to objects to 
the critical view that objects conform to cognition. I might seem to be suggesting that to 
say that objects conform to cognition is just another way of saying that cognition 
conforms to objects.  
On the contrary, I have been arguing that Kant’s shift in perspective, to the critical 
view that objects conform to cognition, or that we determine objective reality, consists 
precisely in the idea that the (possibly) objectively real must necessarily be able to show 
up for us in experience, that there is a necessary connection between the possibility of 
representing objective reality and the possibility of objective reality itself. On the 
precritical, cognition-conforming-to-objects view, there is no necessary connection 
between these possibilities, which is to say that on the precritical view, objective reality is 
thought not to be able, by necessity, to appear to us. 
Kant is not making the vacuous claim that we can represent objects because 
objects are representable. He is making the claim that the conditions that make objective 
reality possible must be the very same conditions that make it possible for us to represent 
objective reality. This is a substantive claim about the obtaining of certain conditions that 
connect possible objects necessarily with their possible appearance to us. To make the 
substance of the claim salient, consider what its negation claims, which is that if the 
conditions did not obtain, there would be neither the possibility of objective reality nor 
the possibility of representations of it. We can also make the substance of the claim 
salient by noting that while it connects possible objects necessarily with their possible 
appearance to us, it also connects impossible objects necessarily with their impossible 
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appearance to us.56 That is, the claim that we can represent things that appear to us is 
always coupled with the claim that we cannot represent things that do not satisfy the 
conditions for the possibility of appearing to us. If something cannot appear to us, then it 
cannot be an ingredient of objective reality. 
In saying that we determine objective reality, or that objects conform to cognition, 
Kant has redefined what it means for something to be objectively real. Kant rethinks the 
character of objective reality in an attempt to explain the possibility of representing the 
objectively real. He says that an essential feature of objective reality is that it can be 
represented. That is, objective reality should be understood not as something that is 
radically divorced from our ability to represent it, but understood rather as something 
which must possibly show up for us, as something which we must be able to represent. 
On this picture, it is impossible for us to be cognitively out of touch with objective 
reality.57  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to clarify what I think Kant means when he says that 
objects conform to cognition and to clarify how the conforming of objects to cognition is 
supposed to explain the possibility of representing objects. What I think it means to say 
that objects conform to cognition is that the conditions for the possibility of representing 
objects are identically the conditions for the possibility of the objects we represent. This 
                                                
56 Impossible objects being things like God, which, because they are not spatiotemporal, cannot show up 
for us in experience. 
57 I am ignoring the possibility of transcendental illusion, which, Kant seems to think, is rationally 
inevitable. But surely, based on what he says about the Antinomies of Pure Reason, Kant thinks that he has 
succeeded in designing a worldview that can show us when we are grasping at impossible objects, thereby 
preventing us from being deceived by transcendental illusion. And that we can and do, from time to time, 
grasp at impossible objects seems to require that we have a firm grasp on which objects are possible and 
real.   
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is supposed to explain the possibility of representing objects, I think, in the following 
way. If the possibility of objects and the possibility of their appearing to us share the 
same conditions, then if something has shown up for us, then it is, in virtue of its having 
shown up for us, a really possible object, and if something is a really possible object, a 
genuinely possible ingredient of objective reality, then it can show up for us.  
The reason I have tried to clarify what Kant means by objects conforming to 
cognition and have tried to clarify how objects conforming to cognition is supposed to 
explain the possibility of representing objects is that Kant believes that his transcendental 
idealism, which supposes that objects conform to cognition, is the best way to explain the 
possibility of objective reference. He opposes the view that objects conform to cognition 
to the view that objects do not conform to cognition. The latter view is that of 
transcendental realism. In the next chapter, I will elaborate the contrast between 
transcendental realism and Kant’s transcendental idealism, and explain why Kant thinks 
that transcendental realism cannot adequately explain the possibility of objective 
reference.    
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CHAPTER THREE: 
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM, AND 
THE POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIVE REFERENCE 
 
In this chapter, I would like to explore the distinction that Kant draws between 
transcendental idealism and transcendental realism, and to figure out why Kant thinks the 
former is a better way to secure empirical realism than the latter. In the previous chapters, 
I have characterized transcendental idealism, and I have tried to say why Kant thinks that 
it can explain the possibility of objective reference. What I have not done yet, and what I 
need to do now, is to supply a characterization of transcendental realism, the worldview 
to which Kant opposes his own, and to explain why Kant thinks that transcendental 
realism cannot explain the possibility of objective reference. The most extended 
treatment that I have found of the opposition that Kant sets up between transcendental 
idealism and transcendental realism is in Henry Allison’s book, Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism.58 In what follows, then, I refer often to Allison’s account. 
So far, through two chapters, I have tried to demonstrate that Kant’s 
transcendental idealism is built to explain the possibility of representing objects and that 
it explains this possibility by saying that the conditions that make objects themselves 
possible are the same conditions that make it possible for us to represent them. If Kant is 
right, then if an object has shown up for us, we can be sure that that object is a really 
possible ingredient of objective reality, and not just some figment that could never be 
objectively real. Likewise, we can be sure that if something is a really possible ingredient 
                                                
58 See especially Chapter Two, pp. 20-49, but also note that Allison says that the contrast is the 
“centerpiece” of his interpretation (p. xv). 
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of objective reality, then we would be able to represent that something, or, to say the 
same thing, that something would be able to show up for us as a part of the objective 
world. 
The possibility of objects showing up for us in experience, that is, the possibility 
of objective reference, is important because judgments can be objectively true and false, 
that is, objectively meaningful, only if they refer to objects (A155/B194). And we can 
have knowledge only if we have objectively meaningful judgments. But we all ought to 
agree, Kant says, that we do have knowledge. So since we do have knowledge, then we 
must have objectively meaningful judgments, which means that really existing objects 
must be able to show up for us in experience. And of course, as I have argued, Kant’s 
project consists in explaining how objects can show up for us in experience. 
Moreover, because we have knowledge, and because it is of really existing 
objects, we ought to be empirical realists. That is, we ought to hold as basic to our 
worldview the belief that we have knowledge of an objective world that shows up for us 
in experience (Bxxxix, footnote). Any worldview that cannot accommodate this belief 
should be abandoned (ibid.). Therefore, since an empirical realist worldview depends 
upon our having knowledge of really existing objects, and our having such knowledge 
depends upon our possibly referring to objects, any worldview that cannot explain the 
possibility of objective reference should be abandoned.      
It is no secret that Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the best, if not the 
only, way to explain the possibility of objective reference.59 Transcendental idealism’s 
success, Kant says, is a result of its acknowledging the transcendental distinction, or, 
                                                
59 Again, see Prolegomena, p. 29, where Kant says that transcendental idealism is the only way to ensure, 
as against “the chicaneries of shallow metaphysics” that geometry is valid of real objects. 
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what comes to the same thing, its saying that the conditions for the possibility of the 
objects we represent just are the conditions for the possibility of our representing those 
objects. What is less well-known, or at least not often talked about, is that to his own 
transcendental idealism Kant opposes a worldview whose adherents, according to Kant, 
repeatedly treat appearances as things in themselves, that is, as things that are 
unconditioned by our being able to represent them. This chronic confusion of 
appearances with things in themselves Kant calls the “common prejudice” (A740/B768) 
or the “common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of [what Kant calls] 
appearances” (A536/B564). Since it confuses appearances with things in themselves, that 
is, since it does not acknowledge the transcendental distinction, Kant apparently thinks 
that this worldview cannot explain the possibility of objective reference. This worldview 
Kant calls transcendental realism. 
The references in the Critique to transcendental realism are few, which is perhaps 
the reason it is not often talked about. It might be supposed that the scarcity of references 
belies any supposed importance of the contrast between transcendental idealism and 
transcendental realism. But Allison points out that although Kant does not often call it by 
name, Kant does refer to transcendental realism when he speaks, as I mentioned before, 
of the “common prejudice” and of the “common but fallacious presupposition,” and when 
he accuses philosophers of many sorts of granting “absolute” or “transcendental” reality 
to objects, which Kant thinks are appearances (B53).60 That is, anybody who confuses 
appearances with things in themselves is a transcendental realist, whether or not we dub 
her so. 
                                                
60 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. 22. 
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The significance of the opposition between transcendental idealism and 
transcendental realism issues from Kant’s claim that they are mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive standpoints and that the latter standpoint rests on a fundamental 
mistake.61 This claim is arresting. For if transcendental idealism more or less begins with 
Kant, then all philosophies before Kant, despite their many and remarkable differences, 
are just versions of transcendental realism. And this implies that all philosophies before 
Kant rest on a fundamental mistake. 
We should, of course, be wary of such an extreme claim. That the disjunction 
between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism is mutually exclusive we can 
allow, for its mutual exclusiveness just follows from Kant’s definitions of the two 
standpoints. That the disjunction is exhaustive we cannot as effortlessly allow. It would 
take some work to show that all philosophies before Kant are defined by the “common 
but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality” of objects. Nevertheless, as Henry 
Allison argues, it might be helpful to remember that Kant makes a parallel claim, in his 
practical philosophy, about all moral theories before him.62 That is, Kant introduces 
autonomy as the condition for the possibility of a genuinely categorical imperative, 
contrasts autonomy with heteronomy, and goes on to say that all previous moral theories 
were committed to the latter and could therefore never account for the possibility of a 
genuinely categorical imperative. Taking this parallel into consideration does not make 
Kant’s claim about transcendental realism less bold, but it does make it understandable. 
Transcendental realism and the principle of heteronomy each are supposed to be a 
                                                
61 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. xv. 
62 Ibid., p. 23. 
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standpoint, or even a confusion, that is shared by all philosophies that do not 
acknowledge what the theoretical and practical critical philosophy acknowledges.63 
But let us get back to the contrast between transcendental idealism and 
transcendental realism and see what Kant has to say about it. Kant’s most thorough and 
explicit treatment of the contrast is in his Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism of 
Transcendental Psychology (A369-71). The only other explicit reference to 
transcendental realism is in the Antinomy of Pure Reason (A490-91/B518-19). 
 I will soon have occasion to quote these passages at length and to scrutinize them 
more closely. For now, a summary will have to do. In these passages, Kant says, as I have 
said, that the defining feature of transcendental realism is its confusion of what Kant 
takes as appearances with what Kant calls things in themselves. This is to say that 
transcendental realists suppose that the objects that show up for us in experience are as 
they are in themselves, unconditioned by the possibility of their showing up for us in 
experience. Kant also says that it is precisely because transcendental realism confuses 
appearances with things in themselves that it “gives way” to an empirical idealism. Based 
on the definition of transcendental realism, and based on Kant’s evocations of 
transcendental realism giving way to empirical idealism and of the transcendental realist 
“afterward playing the empirical idealist” (A369), we may infer that transcendental 
realism’s basic assumption—that the objects that show up for us in experience are 
unconditioned by the conditions for the possibility of their showing up for us—is an 
assumption that, if true, would rationally compel an empirical idealism.  
                                                
63 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. 23. 
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 From the start, then, and without much scrutiny, we have found some things to 
consider and some questions to ask. First of all, if transcendental realism yields empirical 
idealism, then transcendental realism is not actually what it intends to be, namely, a 
worldview that recognizes the objective reality of things that we think about and talk 
about. Second, and simply for the sake of reminding ourselves of one of Kant’s guiding 
intentions, we should note also that Kant finds empirical idealism’s inevitability, on the 
hypothesis of transcendental realism, regrettable. Kant wants to avoid any worldview that 
precludes our being empirical realists; it is for the sake of empirical realism that he 
elaborates his transcendental idealism. Third, we need to investigate transcendental 
realism further in order to see why it would lead inevitably to empirical idealism. It is to 
these matters that that rest of this chapter attends.   
Let me begin the characterization of transcendental realism by indicating a slight, 
but, by my lights, helpful disagreement I have with Allison’s characterization. While 
Allison says that the distinction between transcendental idealism and transcendental 
realism is one between metaphilosophical standpoints, I say that it is a distinction 
between substantive worldviews.64 Allison calls them metaphilosophical because 
transcendental realism [for one] . . . encompasses a wide variety of 
metaphysical and epistemological views. Accordingly, what unites the 
various forms of such realism, many of which would not be viewed as 
realisms in any of the commonly accepted senses of the term, can only be 
an implicit commitment to a philosophical methodology, a way of 
analyzing metaphysical and epistemological issues that is shared by 
rationalist and empiricist, dogmatist and skeptic, and first challenged by 
Kant. . . . [I]t follows that [transcendental] idealism must be interpreted as 
itself a methodology or standpoint rather than as a substantive 
metaphysical doctrine.65 
 
                                                
64 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. xv. 
65 Ibid. 
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Allison’s point in describing the two transcendental worldviews as metaphilosophical 
apparently has to do with his wanting to capture the fact that transcendental realism, for 
one, encompasses “a wide variety of epistemological and metaphysical views.” And 
Allison’s point in describing them as standpoints apparently has to do with his not 
wanting to suggest that they are “substantive metaphysical doctrines,” and his thinking 
that standpoints are more like methodologies: weaker, more commodious, implicit, and 
maybe just less brazenly metaphysical than substantive metaphysical doctrines. That is, I 
think that Allison wants to call transcendental idealism and transcendental realism 
metaphilosophical standpoints because they embrace a lot of different philosophies and 
presumably cannot, at the risk of excluding a philosophy or two, say something too 
contentful.  
With Allison, I too hesitate to call transcendental idealism and transcendental 
realism strictly metaphysical doctrines. And I too want to say that commitment to one or 
the other entails a philosophical methodology or “a way of analyzing metaphysical or 
epistemological issues.” And transcendental realism, at least, is likely a largely tacit 
commitment, sunken into our way of picturing things. But I would not hesitate to call 
transcendental idealism and transcendental realism substantive worldviews. Indeed, it is 
because they are substantive worldviews, I will suggest, that they each both entail certain 
ways of analyzing philosophical issues and encompass a wide variety of views, 
epistemological and metaphysical. Let me explain.  
As I discussed in my first chapter, Allison views Kant’s transcendental idealism 
as a primarily epistemological standpoint and Kant’s critical project as one which effects 
a shift in what counts as knowing and which, as a consequence, effects a shift in 
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perspective about the character of what is known, that is, of objective reality. 
Correspondingly, Allison views transcendental realism as a primarily epistemological 
standpoint. Not only is transcendental realism defined negatively as a refusal to 
acknowledge the transcendental distinction, but it is defined positively, Allison says, by 
“a commitment to a theocentric paradigm or model of cognition.”66 The theocentric 
model holds as ideal “an eternalistic, God’s-eye view of things.”67 Thus, transcendental 
realists, with their commitment to the theocentric model, think that genuine knowledge is 
always of (what Kant considers as) things in themselves, things that are as they are 
independently of the conditions for the possibility of their appearing to finite, discursive, 
sensuous knowers. Human knowledge, on the theocentric model, unavoidably fails to be 
genuine knowledge, or at least succeeds only in being a simulacrum of genuine 
knowledge. For Allison, Kant’s critical turn consists of the rejection of the theocentric 
model of cognition and the promulgation of an anthropocentric model of cognition, thus 
making it possible to see how humans could have genuine knowledge.68 
Allison is right to seek a positive definition of transcendental realism, in addition 
to a negative one. But I think he has had a positive one all along. If transcendental realists 
refuse to acknowledge the transcendental distinction, then this means that they confuse 
appearances with things in themselves. And if transcendental realists confuse 
appearances with things in themselves, then this means that they suppose that objective 
reality is as it is independently of the conditions for the possibility of its showing up for 
us in experience, or of our representing it. This means that transcendental realism is 
                                                
66 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. 28. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p. 29. 
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defined by a commitment to the view that if there can be such thing as full-blooded 
objective reality, then it must not be essentially able to show up for us in experience. 
According to transcendental realism, objects, if they are to be real objects, must be as 
they are, independently of their being able to appear to us.  
Correlatively, according to transcendental idealism, objects, if they are to be real 
objects, must be essentially able to show up for us in experience. Objects are conditioned 
by the same conditions that make it possible for them to show up for us in experience. 
This is how Kant attempts to explain the possibility of objective reference. But if this is 
the case, then we can conclude that transcendental realism was not, by Kant’s lights, 
doing a good job of accounting for the possibility of objective reference. And since Kant 
finds it necessary to rethink the character of and our relation to objective reality in order 
to explain the possibility of objective reference, then it is quite plausible, though 
admittedly not necessary, to conclude that transcendental realism’s commitment to a 
certain view of the character of and our relation to objective reality is preventing any of 
its versions from explaining the possibility of objective reference. In sum, that is, Kant 
has to rethink the character of and our relation to objective reality in order to explain the 
possibility of objective reference, which most likely means that, since transcendental 
realism cannot explain the possibility of objective reference, transcendental realism has 
the wrong idea about the character of and our relation to objective reality. But this 
implies that transcendental realism has an idea about the character of and our relation to 
objective reality. It is therefore reasonable to think that transcendental realism says, 
explicitly or not, something of the form: Objective reality must have such-and-such a 
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character and we must have such-and-such a relation to it. But this means, I think, that it 
is a positive, substantive worldview. 
The transcendental realist worldview says that objective reality, in order to be 
objective reality, must be independent of the conditions for the possibility of 
representation. Because transcendental realists think this, they think also that genuine 
knowledge must be of whatever is independent of the conditions for the possibility of 
representation. This accords with what I said in my first chapter, that there are two tightly 
connected transcendental realist assumptions: first, that objects in lawful relations really 
exist only if they are not essentially conceptualizable, that is, only if they are independent 
of the conditions for the possibility of representation; and second, that knowledge of 
essentially conceptualizable things, of things that fall under the conditions for the 
possibility of representation, is an inferior imitation of a pure, divine, and therefore 
epistemically ideal knowledge. What I am now saying is that the tight connection is, 
more specifically, one of entailment. The transcendental realist’s commitment to a certain 
view of what objective reality must be like in order to be objective reality entails the 
transcendental realist’s commitment to a theocentric model of cognition: If the really real 
is whatever is independent of its being able to appear to us, then genuine knowledge, 
necessarily of the really real, is of whatever is independent of its being able to appear to 
us.     
Thus, it is precisely because transcendental realism is a substantive worldview 
about the character of and our relation to objective reality that it entails a certain 
epistemological model of what knowledge is. It also, of course, says something 
metaphysical. It says of any possible objective reality that it must be of such-and-such a 
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character in order to be objective reality. But transcendental realism also entails a view of 
how the mind is supposed to get in cognitive touch with the objectively real. If, according 
to transcendental realism, the objectively real is supposed to be as it is, independently of 
the conditions for the possibility of our representing it, then this both intimates a certain 
philosophical problem of how we come to represent the objectively real and delimits the 
kind of response to the problem that philosophers can offer. That is, transcendental 
realism, with its commitment to a certain understanding of the character of and our 
relation to objective reality, “encompasses a wide variety” of philosophical views and 
also suggests “a way of analyzing metaphysical or epistemological issues.” The fact that 
transcendental realism does so does not mean that it is not a substantive worldview. It just 
means that it is a deeply embedded, firmly rooted, and implicitly sustained substantive 
worldview. And this may be why it is so difficult to topple. 
Transcendental idealism must therefore also be a substantive worldview. It is 
neither deeply embedded, firmly rooted, nor implicitly sustained, but it is a substantive 
worldview. As I have been arguing, it says something about the character of and our 
relation to objective reality, and based on what it says, we can derive a new 
epistemological model, and a new set of questions with a new way of addressing them, 
and a new way to think of our cognitive relationship to objective reality. Transcendental 
idealism says of any possible objective reality that it must fall under the same conditions 
that condition the possibility of its showing up for us in experience. And because 
objective reality is so conditioned, it is essentially able to show up for us in experience. 
That is, part of what it is to be objective reality is to be able to show up for us in 
experience. Transcendental idealism, therefore, is defined positively by its commitment 
 72 
to the view that if there can be such thing as full-blooded objective reality, then it must be 
able essentially to show up for us in experience. 
We now have the requisite materials to address the question of why 
transcendental realism turns into an empirical idealism. Let us remind ourselves of what 
Kant says. There are at least three relevant passages, two of which I have already 
mentioned, and the last of which is found a little later in the Criticism of the Fourth 
Paralogism: 
The transcendental realist therefore represents [that is, interprets] outer 
appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which 
would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be 
outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. It is really this 
transcendental realist who afterwards plays the empirical idealist; and after 
he has falsely presupposed about objects of the senses that if they are to 
exist they must have their existence in themselves even apart from sense, 
he finds from this point of view all our representations of sense are 
insufficient to make their [that is, the objects of senses’] reality certain 
(A369). 
 
In contrast, transcendental realism necessarily falls into embarrassment, 
and finds itself required to give way to empirical idealism, because it 
regards the objects of outer sense as something different from the senses 
themselves and regards mere appearances as self-sufficient beings that are 
found external to us; for here, even with our best consciousness of our 
representations of these things, it is obviously far from certain that if the 
representation exists, then the object corresponding to it would also exist. 
(A371). 
 
If we let outer objects count as things in themselves, then it is absolutely 
impossible to comprehend how we are to acquire cognition of their reality 
outside us, since we base this merely on the representation, which is in us. 
For one cannot have sensation outside oneself, but only in oneself . . . 
(A378). 
 
At A371 and A378, Kant discusses the suggestions that the only way to access 
objects is by way of representation and that the only way to know that the objects we are 
accessing are really possible objects is by way of representation. The latter is what Kant 
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means when he says that our knowledge of the reality of objects outside us must be based 
“merely on the representation.” This just follows from what I mentioned in my second 
chapter, that to know anything at all about objective reality—its form, its content, its real 
existence—objective reality must show up for us in experience (B1). We are finite, 
discursive, sensuous knowers; we could never, by some non-experiential, purely logical 
means, be assured of the really possible existence of objects.69 So, if we want to know 
whether the objects corresponding to our representations really exist, we can only come 
to know this through our representations of those objects.  
In these passages, Kant also provides a definition of transcendental realism. The 
transcendental realist interprets “outer appearances . . . as things in themselves, which 
would exist independently of us and of our sensibility,” and “falsely presupposes” that if 
objects of the senses “are to exist, they must have their existence in themselves even apart 
from sense” (A369). Now, what the translators here term “existence” should not be 
confused with the sheer existence of which I spoke in my second chapter. For, as I 
explained in my second chapter, objects do indeed have their sheer existence 
“independently of us and our sensibility.” Kant would not disagree on that point. What 
Kant means here by “existence,” I suppose, is what I have sometimes called full-blooded 
objective reality. Thus the transcendental realist interprets outer appearances as having 
full-blooded existence independently of our sensibility. The mistake that transcendental 
realists make, that is, is to think that full-blooded objects—electrons and the cloud 
chambers that detect them, stars and the planets that orbit them—must have their 
(possible) full-blooded existence independently of the conditions for the possibility of 
                                                
69 Hence the failure, in Kant’s eyes, of the ontological proof for the existence of God. 
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showing up for us in experience. But this is to say that transcendental realists, according 
to Kant, take a stand, albeit an incorrect one, on the character of and our relation to 
objective reality. So, just as I argued just above, transcendental realism, except only 
derivatively, is not defined by some epistemological stance, as Allison would have it. As 
Kant says, transcendental realists interpret “outer appearances”—the objective world—as 
things in themselves and falsely presuppose that if objects are to exist—if there is to be 
such thing as objective reality—then these objects must have their existence in 
themselves (A369). What defines transcendental realism is its supposition that objective 
reality, if it is to be full-blooded objective reality, must be as it is independently of the 
conditions for the possibility of its showing up for us in experience. 
We should also note in these passages the ambiguity of what Kant means by 
objects being outside us. At A369, Kant says that the transcendental realist mistakenly 
thinks that objects, in order to be objects, must exist “outside us according to pure 
concepts of the understanding.” But at A378, Kant laments the fact that transcendental 
realist cannot account for our cognizing objects whose reality is outside us. So Kant first 
chides the transcendental realist for thinking that objects are outside us, but then chides 
the transcendental realist for not accounting for the reality of objects outside us. The 
ambiguity is resolved when we realize that there are two ways for something to be 
outside us, and, correlatively, two ways for something to be inside us. Kant says, 
[W]e are talking . . . about the empirical object, which is called an external 
object if it is in space and an inner object if it is represented simply in the 
relation of time; but space and time are both to be encountered only in us. 
But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable 
ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself, 
exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to 
outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept 
in the latter significance—in which it is taken in the proper psychological 
 75 
question about the reality of our outer intuition—we will distinguish 
empirically external objects from those that might be called ‘external’ in 
the transcendental sense” (A373).  
 
Kant here distinguishes between something’s being inside or outside us 
empirically and something’s being inside or outside us transcendentally. Outer objects, 
like flowers, are outside us empirically, insofar as they are, Kant says, “things that are to 
be encountered in space” (ibid.). Inner objects, like the scents of flowers, are inside us 
empirically insofar as they are “represented simply in the relation of time.” This coheres 
with what I argued in my first chapter, that mere seemings—inner objects—and objective 
states of affairs—outer objects—must both, in order to be inner and outer objects, 
possibly show up for us in experience. That is, they both must be possible appearances. 
The distinction we draw between how things seem to us and how things really are in the 
world is an empirical distinction, one that we can draw only within the bounds of possible 
appearance. It is not a distinction we can draw between something that can appear and 
something that cannot appear.  
If something does lie beyond the bounds of possible appearance, then it is, 
according to Kant, “outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding,” or 
outside us transcendentally. Accordingly, something is inside us transcendentally if it lies 
within the bounds of possible appearance, that is, if it is conditioned by the conditions for 
the possibility of its showing up for us in experience. Since both the possibility of the 
representation of objects and the possibility of the objects we represent fall under the 
same conditions for the possibility of showing up for us in experience, then both our 
representations of objects and those objects themselves are inside us transcendentally. 
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We can say, then, that the transcendental realist, by refusing to countenance the 
transcendental distinction, thinks that objective reality, which is outside us empirically, 
must also be outside us transcendentally. To put it another way, transcendental realism 
supposes that objective reality, if there is such thing, and in order to be objective reality, 
must be unconditioned by any conditions for the possibility of showing up for us in 
experience. That is, transcendental realism supposes that objective reality must not be 
essentially able to appear to us. It is for this reason, Kant thinks, that transcendental 
realism rationally compels an empirical idealism, since “if we let outer objects count as 
things in themselves, then it is absolutely impossible to comprehend how we are to 
acquire cognition of their reality outside us, since we base this merely on the 
representation, which is in us” (A378). And since, on the hypothesis of transcendental 
realism, we cannot be certain, based on our representations, of the reality of the objects 
that we represent, then we must be skeptical, or empirical, idealists, that is, we must 
admit that “the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful (A367). 
Let us expand Kant’s argument. We must concede, first of all, that if we want to 
know whether the object of which we have a representation is a possibly existing object, 
we can only come to know this through the representation of the object (A371, A378). 
We cannot step outside our representation of the object, determine whether the object 
possibly exists, then step back inside our representation, and carry on with the assurance 
that our representation has referred to a possibly existing object. For such determining 
would just be more representing. The representation, Kant says, is in us, and cannot be 
otherwise (A378). This is also a way of pointing up the fact that on both the 
transcendental idealist and the transcendental realist worldviews, we can always be quite 
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sure that we have a representation, for we are immediately aware of it (A367, A370). 
What is at stake, of course, in both worldviews, is whether that representation, which is 
“in” us and of which we are immediately aware, can refer to a really existing external 
object. 
Now, according to both transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, 
representations are in us empirically, yet they are supposed to refer to objects that are 
outside us empirically. Transcendental realism, though, because it does not acknowledge 
the transcendental distinction, supposes that the objects that are outside us empirically are 
also outside us transcendentally. This means, if what I have been saying is right, that the 
objects that are outside us empirically are supposed by transcendental realism not to be 
essentially able to show up for us in experience. The reference of the representation, 
which is in us empirically, to the object, which is supposed to be outside us 
transcendentally, must therefore, on the hypothesis of transcendental realism, be a 
relation between that which is essentially able to show up for us in experience and that 
which is not.  
But if that were the relation between representations and the objects they 
supposedly represent, then, as transcendental realism rightly concludes, we would never 
be sure that our representations were referring to possibly existing objects. Given our 
representations, we would not be able to guarantee, by way of those representations, that 
they refer to possible objects, since, on the hypothesis of transcendental realism, possible 
objects are not necessarily representable, not necessarily able to show up for us in 
experience. And if possible objects were not necessarily able to show up for us in 
experience, then they would be only contingently able to show up for us in experience, if 
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at all. There would be nothing about the fact that we have representations that would 
indicate necessarily whether the objects we have representations of were possibly real. 
That is, since we can only cognize the possible existence of objects through our 
representing them, then we would be able, if the fact that we represented a possible object 
said nothing of the object’s possible existence, only to guess whether our representations 
referred to possibly existing objects. As Kant puts it, “[E]ven with our best consciousness 
of our representations of these things, it is obviously far from certain [on the hypothesis 
of transcendental realism] that if the representation exists, then the object corresponding 
to it would also exist” (A371). 
A juxtaposition of transcendental idealism and transcendental realism should 
sharpen the contrast. As I have sometimes put it, according to transcendental idealism, if 
an object has shown up for us in experience, then it is necessarily a possibly existing 
object; and if an object possibly exists, then it necessarily can show up for us in 
experience. Therefore, if objects are necessarily able to show up for us, then we will 
always be able to refer to really existing objects—they will be within our cognitive reach. 
And if an object that shows up for us in experience is necessarily a possibly existing 
object, then we will always be able to say, based simply on our representation of it, that 
our representation has succeeded in referring to a really possible object—something that, 
if actual, would necessarily fit into the wider objective world. 
According to transcendental realism, on the other hand, if an object has shown up 
for us in experience, then it is only contingently a possibly existing object; and if an 
object possibly exists, then it is not necessarily able to show up for us. Therefore, if an 
object is not necessarily able to show up for us, then we may never be able to refer to that 
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part of objective reality—it will be out of our cognitive reach. And if something that 
shows up for us in experience is not necessarily a possibly existing object, then we may 
never be able to say, based simply on our representation of it, whether our representation 
has succeeded in referring to a really possible ingredient of objective reality—for that 
something may be a mere figment, not able to fit into the wider objective world.    
Transcendental realism, then, allows that a really existing object may never be 
able to show up for us in experience and allows that something that does show up for us 
in experience may not be a possibly existing object. Because it allows that something that 
shows up for us in experience is not necessarily a possibly existing object, transcendental 
realism allows that our representations, which are in us empirically, may not refer to 
empirically external, really existing objects. That is, it allows, at best, that we can guess 
correctly as to whether our representations refer to really possible objects, and, at worst, 
that we may be aware only of our representations, not of the objective world to which 
they purportedly refer. And if transcendental realism allows that really existing objects 
are possibly mere figments, then transcendental realism is actually an empirical idealism, 
a worldview that supposes that “we can never be fully certain,” based on “any possible 
experience” of them, that the “external objects of sense” are real (A368).70 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that transcendental realism cannot explain the 
possibility of objective reference because, according to Kant, transcendental realism, as a 
substantive worldview, has mistaken the character of objective reality. The mistake 
                                                
70 I should add here that Kant thought that even Humean impressions are outside us transcendentally, since, 
on Hume's hypothesis, they do not fall under any conditions for the possibility of showing up for us in 
experience. On Hume's hypothesis, according to Kant, there is nothing to guarantee that we could make 
reference to our impressions. That is, there is nothing to guarantee that the impressions are really there.    
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transcendental realism makes is to suppose that objective reality, in order to be full-
blooded objective reality, simply cannot be essentially able to show up for us in 
experience. But, Kant says, if objective reality must not be essentially able to show up for 
us in experience, then we cannot secure the necessary bond between representations and 
their objects. Two considerations help to explain why, if we were transcendental realists, 
we could not secure the necessary bond. First, it is only through the possibility of 
representing objects that we could ever know whether the objects we purport to represent 
are possibly existing objects, instead of, perhaps, mere figments. And second, if objects 
were not necessarily able to show up for us in experience, then they would be only 
contingently able to show up for us in experience. But then we could not be guaranteed 
that when we have a representation of an object, the representation, rather than being “a 
mere play” of our minds, is referring to a possibly existing object, since the fact that we 
have the representation would indicate nothing about the really possible existence of its 
object. Transcendental realism, in Kant’s eyes, wants the impossible. It wants our 
representations to refer to real objects, but it does not want those real objects to be 
essentially representable. 
Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, supposes that objective reality, in 
order to be full-blooded objective reality, must be essentially able to show up for us in 
experience. Objective reality is essentially able to show up for us because, according to 
Kant, the conditions for the possibility of representing objects are the same as the 
conditions for the possibility of those objects themselves. We are thereby guaranteed that 
if we are able to represent an object, then the object is possibly real, and that if an object 
is possibly real, then we are able to represent it. We are also thereby guaranteed objective 
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judgments, since our representations cannot fail to refer to (at least possibly) real 
ingredients of objective reality, which are brought into view for us to form objectively 
true or false judgments about. It is in this way, finally, that Kant thinks he has secured 
empirical realism, the idea that there is a really existing objective world that we can come 
to know through experience.         
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